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EDITORIAL NOTE:
Between 1997 and 2001, SAMP conducted three representative nation-
al surveys of Zimbabwean citizens in order to provide insights into the
attitudes, perceptions and migration behaviours of ordinary citizens.
This publication brings together the results from two of these surveys
(the 1997 Public Opinion Survey and the 2001 National Immigration
Policy Survey). The results of the third survey, on the Zimbabwean
brain drain, will be published shortly by SAMP. This policy paper also
contains an overview of the major migration trends in Zimbabwe since
independence, written by Professor Lovemore Zinyama, formerly of the
University of Zimbabwe. SAMP wishes to express its sincere thanks to
Dr Zinyama for his contribution, in difficult circumstances, to the set-
up and early work of the Project. Thanks are also due to the many stu-
dent researchers who participated in the surveys, to Abel Chikanda for
his help, and to Wade Pendleton, David McDonald and Don Taylor for
their technical assistance in survey design. The National Immigration
Policy Survey was directed by Dr Daniel Tevera of University of
Zimbabwe, who is co-editor of this publication. The editors wish to
thank Christina Decarie for her editorial assistance and CIDA who
funded the research through its generous support of SAMP.
INTRODUCTION: ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE
The movement of people across political boundaries has gener-ated considerable debate in Southern Africa. There is a com-pelling need for Southern African countries to harmoniseregional migration policies and to ensure the freer movement
of people across the region. However, it must be noted that disparities
in levels of development are still evident in the economies of the
region. There are fears in countries such as South Africa and Botswana
that the freer movement of people will flood them with migrants from
the less developed countries. There are also concerns in all the coun-
tries of SADC that freer movement will not be well received by citi-
zens, leading to intolerance and xenophobia.
As Southern Africa moves towards a more globalised future, there is
need for African governments to have the best information on which to
make policy decisions. Migration policy is not static but undergoes con-
stant modification as a country’s experiences with and perceptions of
migrants change. Immigration policy is often a divisive issue on domes-
tic political agendas. In times of economic recession, immigrants are
unjustifiably blamed for high unemployment rates, increasing crime,
and land and housing shortages. Politicians often give high priority to
migration issues, sometimes alienating ethnic groups and substantially
affecting immigration programmes. Immigrants in pursuit of work have
often become pariah citizens in a global order in which, paradoxically,
old borders are rapidly dissolving.
Rising xenophobia and violence against foreigners are sobering and
sad reminders of the negative effects of globalisation. National govern-
ments have also been blamed for fuelling xenophobia by perpetuating
stereotypes against foreigners, describing them as a ‘flood’ and stereotyp-
ing them as criminals. Invariably the way the government treats for-
eigners also determines the attitude of the local population towards the
foreigner. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of for-
eigners in local newspapers. For example, it has been shown that anti-
immigrant sentiments are widespread in South African print media
which can also have an impact on the way the local population view
foreigners. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of
foreigners by officials in local media.
The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) conducts basic
research for policy-making on the dynamics of international migration to
and within the SADC region. SAMP maintains that a well-informed pol-
icy-maker or migration manager is more likely to appreciate the viability
of different policy choices and to develop policies that are workable,
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democratic and consistent with principles of good governance and
regional cooperation. Policies based on outdated or misleading informa-
tion will not only fail but have damaging consequences. From a human
rights standpoint, such decisions could violate constitutional guarantees
and exacerbate hostility towards non-citizens.
SAMP is also committed to conducting such research at a regional
scale. Research results from one country, such as Zimbabwe, can be
compared with those from the other SADC states. This helps to high-
light similarities and differences in national migration regimes but also
helps define areas of potential cooperation and harmonization between
states. SAMP therefore believes that the collection of reliable and accu-
rate data on the dimensions, causes, impacts and trends in migration is
an essential first step. Only then can there be informed debate and
movement forward on regional harmonization.
Within the Southern African region, Zimbabwe’s migration history
is unusual. Historically, countries were either recipient or sending coun-
tries for migrants. Zimbabwe was always in the unusual position of being
both. Over the years, many Zimbabweans went to work, primarily in
South Africa. SAMP research shows, for example, that almost a quarter
of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked
in South Africa at some point in their lives. On the other hand,
Zimbabwe was a recipient of labour migrants from countries such as
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the time of the 1951 census,
there were 246,000 foreign Africans in Zimbabwe (40% of them from
Mozambique). Zimbabwe was a source, a destination and a corridor.
Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced considerable shifts
in the inherited colonial migration pattern:
• Internal rural-urban migration and urbanization has increased
dramatically, although the true extent of this trend will not be
evident until the results of the latest census are available. 
• Zimbabwe has become a far more significant exporter of migrant
labour as economic conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated.
Zimbabwe, unlike Mozambique and the BLS countries, has no
international bilateral treaty facilitating such movements. As a
result, there are only limited opportunities for Zimbabweans to
work legally in South Africa. Significant undocumented migra-
tion began in the late 1980s and has increased ever since.
• Zimbabwe is no longer a major recipient of migrant labour
except, perhaps, along the border with Mozambique. 
• The volume of ordinary cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe
and its neighbours has escalated dramatically over the last
decade. Many more Zimbabweans are looking outside the coun-
try for the means of livelihood. In a 1997 SAMP survey,
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Zimbabweans were asked the purpose of their last visit to South
Africa. Over 70% had an economic purpose for migrating with
29% going to work or look for work and 42% going to trade or
to shop. 
Documentation and analysis of these trends and their importance for
policy-makers has been relatively limited. As a result, in 1996 the
Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) entered into a partnership
with the Department of Geography at the University of Zimbabwe to
generate the research data that is urgently needed. This publication
presents some of the results of that partnership.
The first chapter provides a general overview of post-independence
migration to and from Zimbabwe based on official and other published
information sources. The author, Professor Lovemore Zinyama, begins
by pointing out that Zimbabweans are a nation of migrants although
international migration accounts for only a very small proportion of the
total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. Less than 5%
of the total population is estimated to be non-Zimbabwean. In terms of
immigration to Zimbabwe, Zinyama notes the shift in sources from
Britain and the rest of Europe during the colonial era, to a much wider
global catchment dominated by the African continent after independ-
ence. A second major shift has been in government policy away from
active encouragement of permanent residence to the granting of time-
limited residence and employment permits to expatriates. These trends
are well documented although both have slowed in the late 1990s.
Zimbabwe has also continued to be a recipient of undocumented
migrants from its neighbours.
The main shift identified by Zinyama is in patterns of migration
from the country. Zimbabwe has become a significant brain exporter.
The process has occurred in two waves; immediately after independence
when skilled whites fled south and more recently, in the 1990s, with
growing numbers of black Zimbabweans leaving in search of other pas-
tures. The latter process has in some sense been slowed by the post-
1994 hostility of the South African government towards skilled immi-
grants from Africa. However, skilled Zimbabweans are now globally
marketable and are leaving the country in growing numbers. The 2001
SAMP survey reported by Dr Dan Tevera in Chapter 3 asked a sample
of urban Zimbabweans how much consideration they had given to leav-
ing Zimbabwe. Seventy six percent of the respondents reported having
considered leaving Zimbabwe, a sign of the times perhaps. The
Zimbabwean brain drain is the subject of a forthcoming SAMP policy
paper.
Parallel with a growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indi-
cations that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration
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from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly
since the 1980s. Zinyama identifies two categories of undocumented
migrant. The first are Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries,
mostly Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then
over-stay. The second category comprises those who leave Zimbabwe
without valid travel documents and do not use official exit points. This
includes individual “border hoppers” and those relying on trafficking
syndicates. The numbers are impossible to ascertain with any degree of
accuracy although surveys can and do provide important insights into
the intentions, behaviours and strategies of the migrants.
The second chapter in this publication provides important verifica-
tion of this claim. As the author points out, the types, patterns, causes
and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migration are
complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as yet about
who travels outside the country, why and how often. A great deal more
is now known because of a SAMP public opinion survey amongst
migrants conducted in 5 Southern African countries. The results of that
regional survey have been exhaustively detailed and analysed in other
SAMP publications. Here we include a paper by Lovemore Zinyama
which focuses on the migration behaviour of Zimbabweans, as revealed
in their answers to the standardized survey. 
Zinyama argues that in the last decade there has been a qualitative
shift in the nature of migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe,
accompanying changes in the political and economic conditions of both
countries. Migration of young single men for work has continued and
even grown. But economic crisis and decline in Zimbabwe have
prompted a diversification of household survival strategies. Cross-border
migration has become one in a basket of such strategies for many.
Formerly, only young single men would migrate for economic reasons.
Now growing numbers of women have joined the migration stream.
Informal cross-border trade has become dominated by women seeking to
supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children.
Money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods for
importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to
be in short supply at home. More recently, female Zimbabwean cross-
border traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far
afield as Tanzania to purchase and bring home second-hand clothing
and goods for resale.
The new Zimbabwean migrant is typically a middle-aged family per-
son who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of
her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The major-
ity of these people are engaged in a purpose-specific circulatory migra-
tion process, but one in which they are only spending very short periods
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of time in South Africa. In the second chapter, Zinyama provides a
detailed demographic and behavioural profile of these new and old
migrants from the SAMP survey. In addition, he shows that the
migrants have become the target of extreme hostility from South
Africans, particularly since 1994. Levels of intolerance are at an all-
time high in South Africa, leading to the charge that South Africa is
the most xenophobic population in the world. Zimbabweans (and
Mozambicans) have been the usual targets of xenophobic sentiment and
action on the ground. All Zimbabweans have come to be stereotyped as
a social, economic and criminal threat to South Africans. These are
clearly stereotypes with little basis in fact or appreciation of the benefits
of increased trade and economic interaction between South Africa and
Zimbabwe.
Apologists for the xenophobic tendencies of South Africans have
argued that South Africans are not unique, that similar views and atti-
tudes are found throughout the SADC. Even if true, this does not exon-
erate South Africans. It simply means that the task of public and official
education is that much greater. SAMP therefore set out to test this
hypothesis, and to provide SADC governments with baseline informa-
tion on their own citizens’ attitudes to migration, immigration and
refugees. In 2001, SAMP implemented the National Immigration Policy
Survey (NIPS) in five SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The
results of the Zimbabwean NIPS are reported in the third chapter by
Dan Tevera.
The survey showed that, in general, ordinary Zimbabweans are more
tolerant and welcoming than South Africans, have a greater apprecia-
tion of the benefits of migration to their country and have a much more
developed understanding of the necessity for refugee protection.
However, there is certainly no room for complacency. In the South
African case, levels of hostility were high regardless of the race, age,
education, economic status or gender of the respondent. In Zimbabwe,
marked differences emerged around the variable of economic and
employment status.
Of the random sample of urban adults, 38% were engaged in formal
employment and 18.5% in informal sector activities. A further 43.2%
were unemployed. The answers to questions designed to test attitudes
and knowledge consistently broke down along the employed/unem-
ployed divide. They also broke down along the middle-class/poor divide.
In other words, Zimbabweans fit the more classical profile in which
middle-class, educated and economically-secure people are likely to be
more tolerant and accepting of outsiders than the poor and unem-
ployed. This would be a cause for concern given Zimbabwe’s economic
crisis and the growth of poverty and unemployment. However, there is
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little evidence that Zimbabweans explicitly blame migrants and immi-
grants for this state of affairs (again in stark contrast to South Africans).
Zimbabwean migration patterns are currently in a state of flux. It is
commonly assumed that the country’s economic and political condi-
tions over the last decade and more recently are influencing out-migra-
tion. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that the correlation is
simple or direct. More skilled Zimbabweans are leaving but not all are
able to do so and many choose to stay, hoping for a turnaround. The
unemployed and retrenched are more restless and mobile and South
Africa and Botswana are a definite draw card. However, as the South
Africans have yet to appreciate, most are circular migrants and would
much prefer that Zimbabweans had the same legal mechanisms of access
to the South African labour market as do Mozambicans, Batswana,
Swazi and Basotho. It is ironic that apartheid-era labour agreements,
still in force, shut out Zimbabweans but welcome the others. Zimbabwe
needs to seek a general bilateral labour agreement with South Africa, as
well as working within the structures of SADC to encourage greater
cross-border mobility in the region as a whole.
The other major shift of the last decade, requiring a rational policy
response on the part of both governments, is the massive growth of
informal cross-border trade. Zimbabwe sits at the center of regional
informal trade networks. Yet, despite the passage of a SADC Free Trade
Protocol, there is still no framework in place for legal informal traders.
They are shut out once again in the new South African Immigration
Act. This is a gap which urgently requires attention, not least because it
discriminates unfairly against women migrants. It is also obstructive of
the new emphasis on trade and regional cooperation in SADC. The
benefits of freer trade should not be confined to large companies, but to
ordinary people as well. 
Jonathan Crush and Dan Tevera
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CHAPTER ONE
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ZIMBABWE: 
AN OVERVIEW
LOVEMORE ZINYAMA
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The population of Zimbabwe grew from an estimated 713,000at the turn of the twentieth century to 10.41 million at thetime of the last census in 1992. By the late 1990s, the popula-tion had grown to approximately 12.5 million. Urbanisation
has increased rapidly since the mid-1970s, fuelled by internal rural-to-
urban migration. 
International migration accounts for only a very small proportion of
the total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. But the
modest numbers underplay the crucial role of international migration in
the political and economic history of the country.1 Citizens and resi-
dents of Zimbabwe have engaged in international migration for a centu-
ry now, although the predominant racial and economic groups in this
process have changed since independence in response to changing
political and economic conditions. It is generally better-educated and
skilled people who have, since the turn of the twentieth century, been
involved in documented permanent migration into and out of the coun-
try. For a long period, the majority of these migrations were dominated
by whites either entering or leaving the country. But in more recent
years, black Zimbabwean professionals and other educated and skilled
people have been leaving to work outside the country while immigrants
from other African countries have been arriving to take up employment
within Zimbabwe. 
It is thus important to note the shift in immigration source and des-
tination regions for Zimbabwe, from Britain and the rest of Europe dur-
ing the colonial era, to a much wider global catchment dominated by
the African continent after independence.2 Another major shift attrib-
uted to the change in immigration policy of the government after inde-
pendence has been from the active encouragement of permanent resi-
dence to the granting of time-limited residence and employment per-
mits to immigrants (the new phenomenon of expatriate worker).
Besides these documented international movements of skilled
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migrants, there are also large but unknown numbers of people who
enter and leave the country through unofficial ports of entry and whose
movements go unrecorded. Many of these people cross international
borders between Zimbabwe and its neighbouring countries especially
South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique. Zimbabweans continue to
engage in unrecorded cross-border movements to and from South Africa
and Botswana in search of employment and for purposes of informal
trading in those two countries. On the eastern border, it appears to be
primarily undocumented Mozambicans who come into Zimbabwe.
1.2 LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO ZIMBABWE
The 1992 census showed that of the 10.41 million people enumerated,
9.96 million were born in Zimbabwe while 453,405 (4.4%) were born
outside the country. Of those, two special categories deserve mention:
(a) children of Zimbabweans who had left the country to live abroad or
in neighbouring countries during the war of liberation in the 1970s and
returned home with their families after independence in 1980; and (b)
Mozambicans who were still living in refugee camps and elsewhere in
1992 while waiting for the re-establishment of peace within their coun-
try. Of the 247,013 non-Zimbabweans recorded, 164,824 (66.7%) were
Mozambicans, 38,203 (15.5%) were Malawians and 10,003 (4%) were
Zambians. There were 10,654 British and 6,169 South African citizens
recorded in the census. Many of these Mozambican refugees have since
been repatriated or gone back home on their own. 
It is therefore reasonable to infer that lifetime migrants to Zimbabwe
constitute a very small proportion of not more than 3-4% of the total
population. The largest proportion of foreign born residents are people
from neighbouring Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, some of whom
came as labour migrants to work on the mines and commercial farms in
Zimbabwe during the colonial era.
Today, two streams of people legally enter the country from outside
through official ports of entry: those intending to live in the country for
extended periods of time (immigrants) and those visiting for a limited
period (visitors). The Department of Immigration Control and the
Central Statistical Office define an “immigrant” broadly to include (a)
new residents intending to remain in Zimbabwe for at least twelve
months; (b) temporary residents taking up employment for a limited
period; and (c) returning former residents who had declared themselves
as emigrants when they left the country and/or had remained outside
the country for more than twelve months. 
Visitors are defined as (a) residents of other countries who visit
Zimbabwe for periods not exceeding twelve months for any reason other
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than taking up employment; and (b) people in transit who enter the
country en route to other destinations and who spend less than two
nights in passing through the country. Emigrants are defined as (a) resi-
dents who, on departure, declare that they are leaving the country for
more than twelve months; and (b) persons who recorded themselves as
visitors on departure but stayed for more than twelve months.
Table 1.1 shows the trends in migration into and out of Zimbabwe
through official ports since 1980. Overall, the last two decades have
been characterized by annual net migration losses, especially in the
years immediately after independence. The country experienced net
migration losses in 13 of the 18 years from 1980 to 1997. In the early
1980s large numbers of whites were leaving the country. Between 1980
and 1984, there was a net migration loss of over 10,000 people per year.
The peak net migration loss in the history of the country was experi-
enced in 1981, a year after independence, when 20,536 people left
against 7,794 arrivals, a net loss of 12,742. The number of emigrants
each year declined to below 7,000 in the mid-1980s and to below 3,000
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 25
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Table 1.1: Numbers of Immigrants and Emigrants Recorded Through Official Ports of Entry,
1980-1997
Year Number of Immigrants Number of Emigrants Net Migration (+’gain/-’loss)
1980 6,407 17,240 -10,833
1981 7,794 20,536 -12,742
1982 7,715 17,942 -10,225
1983 6,944 19,067 -12,123
1984 5,567 16,979 -11,412
1985 5,471 6,918 -1,447
1986 4,897 3,787 1,110
1987 3,925 5,330 -1,405
1988 2,915 4,305 -1,390
1989 3,342 4,565 -1,223
1990 2,964 4,224 -1,260
1991 3,583 4,031 -448
1992 3,191 2,615 576
1993 3,461 3,056 405
1994 2,921 3,474 -553
1995 2,901 3,281 -380
1996 3,250 1,629 1,621
1997 2,483 1,821 662
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
in the 1990s. The decline in emigration from the mid-1980s was in part
because the population base for potential emigrants - mostly the white
community - had been greatly reduced in number and those who want-
ed to leave had already done so.
The number of immigrants entering the country through official
ports of entry reached its peak during the early 1980s when over 5,000
arrivals were recorded each year between 1980 and 1985. Some of these
were Zimbabweans who had been living abroad during the colonial
period and were now returning home from political exile. Since the late
1980s, the number of immigrants has declined to not more than 3,500
per year. They include expatriate workers on 2-5 year work contracts in
fields where local skills are unavailable in both the public and private
sectors including medicine, engineering, architecture, accountancy and
tertiary education.
During the first few years after independence, returning residents
comprised as much as 20% of the total immigrants each year (Table
1.2). From the mid-1980s, the proportion of temporary residents (i.e.
expatriate workers and their dependents) increased to as much as 80%
of the annual inflow of migrants. The decline in numbers of immigrants
overall from over 7,000 per year in the early 1980s to around 3,000 or
less per year since the mid-1980s is consistent with the government pol-
icy of not actively promoting new permanent residents from abroad.
Only those with specialist skills or investment capital have been admit-
ted, in contrast to the immigration promotion policies of the colonial
government before 1980.3 Today, temporary residents (expatriates) make
up 75-80% of the total annual immigrant population while new immi-
grants coming to settle permanently account for 15-20%, and returning
residents the remaining 5% (Table 1.2).
Table 1.3 shows that the principal source regions for migrants to
Zimbabwe since independence are Africa and Europe. Since 1980,
Africa has accounted for 40-55% of the immigrants into Zimbabwe
while Europe has contributed 30-40% (Table 1.3). In the early 1980s,
the United Kingdom, Zambia and South Africa contributed the largest
proportion of the immigrants. Many were returning Zimbabweans who
had been living in political exile. However, immigration from South
Africa was short lived as, from about 1982, its share dropped from about
20% to 10-12%. The decline was in part because of the political ten-
sions that characterized relations between the two countries over the
apartheid system and the political destabilization by South Africa of its
neighbours.4 However, in the early 1990s, there was a slight increase in
the proportion of immigrants from that country, although the actual
numbers were much smaller than before. The increase, though small,
was in part precipitated by the political uncertainty and insecurity in
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that country prior to the coming to power of the African National
Congress in 1994. On the other hand, the immigrant stream from
Zambia continued throughout the 1980s and only dropped below 10%
of the total number of immigrants in the early 1990s. 
After the first flow of returning Zimbabweans, the United Kingdom
maintained a steady proportion of 15-20% of the immigrants to
Zimbabwe each year. The United Kingdom, as the former colonial
power, has long and strong cultural and political ties with Zimbabwe.
Immigrants to Zimbabwe include white Zimbabweans who had left the
country before or shortly after independence and subsequently decided
to return, as well as British expatriates on work contracts.
As with immigrant flows, Africa and Europe have been the major
destinations for emigrants from Zimbabwe (Table 1.4). Economic sanc-
tions and travel restrictions imposed on the government of Rhodesia by
the international community from the early 1960s, coupled with the
civil war in Mozambique after that country attained its independence
from Portugal in 1975, presented difficulties for migrant workers who
had been recruited from Malawi to work on local commercial farms and
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 25
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Table 1.2: Immigrants to Zimbabwe by Status, 1980-1997 (% of total)
Year Returning Temporary Permanent Total % Total 
Residents Residents Immigrants Immigrants
1980 38.4 5.9 55.7 100 6,407
1981 29.0 4.1 66.9 100 7,794
1982 19.5 2.4 78.1 100 7,715
1983 17.9 29.9 52.2 100 6,944
1984 13.0 58.5 28.5 100 5,567
1985 23.3 51.8 24.9 100 5,471
1986 22.3 38.0 39.7 100 4,897
1987 13.4 41.4 45.2 100 3,925
1988 9.1 53.4 37.5 100 2,915
1989 4.7 70.7 24.6 100 3,342
1990 3.0 82.5 14.5 100 2,964
1991 8.1 77.3 14.6 100 3,583
1992 1.8 87.5 10.7 100 3,191
1993 2.1 85.7 12.2 100 3,461
1994 2.8 88.9 8.3 100 2,921
1995 8.0 78.9 13.1 100 2,901
1996 5.3 76.5 18.2 100 3,250
1997 3.6 80.4 16.0 100 2,483
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
mines. After 1980, many of these Malawians were able to return home
for the first time after many years, resulting in an increase in the pro-
portion of emigrants to that country, from 8% during 1980-81 to over
20% per year during the period 1984-1989. While Zambia was a major
source of immigrants to Zimbabwe (many of them returning residents),
there has been very little movement in the opposite direction, with less
than 5% of the emigrants going to that country each year. Shortly after
independence when large numbers of whites were leaving the country,
the vast majority were going to South Africa, with over 50% per year
during the first four years. Thereafter, as the pool of potential emigrants
became smaller, the proportion of people going to South Africa dropped
to below 20%. The majority of emigrants to Europe went to the United
ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE: PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN ZIMBABWE
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Table 1.3: Immigrants by Region and Country of Last Permanent Residence, 1980-1997 (%)
Region 1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1994- 1996-
and Country 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Africa Total 53.1 50.2 45.3 58.7 44.2 40.2 37.6 44.4 41.8
South Africa 20.4 10.3 12.2 15.5 9.5 11.5 15.9 20.9 19.3
Zambia 20.3 22 16.6 29.7 18.4 15.0 8.1 8.4 7.3
Malawi 6.1 8.6 5.9 5.4 6.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.9
Mozambique 0.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 2.0 2.5
Elsewhere 5.6 8.1 9.6 7.3 8.4 8.1 8.2 8.5 7.8
Americas Total 5.2 5.2 6.7 5.7 8.1 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.1
USA 4.2 3.1 4.4 3.2 5.4 4.3 5.0 4.5 5.2
Canada 0.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.5
Elsewhere 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.4
Asia Total 3.5 8.5 13.6 7.1 10.1 14.3 11.9 11.5 13.3
India 1.6 5.3 7.4 3.6 3.5 5.4 3.8 2.3 3.1
Elsewhere 1.9 3.2 6.2 3.5 6.6 8.9 8.1 9.2 10.2
Europe Total 36.4 34.2 32.8 26.7 35.9 36.2 39.5 35.6 35.4
UK 29.7 23.9 17.9 14 13.4 17.5 18.7 18.2 19.7
Germany 0.8 1.9 2.8 2.2 6.2 2.7 3.6 3.4 2.2
Elsewhere 5.9 8.4 12.1 10.5 16.3 16.0 17.2 14.0 13.5
Oceania Total 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.4 3.0 2.1 2.4
Australia 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.7
Elsewhere 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total # 14,201 14,659 11,038 8,377 6,257 6,547 6,652 5,822 5,733
Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
Kingdom. In fact, since 1990, the United Kingdom has been the princi-
pal destination for emigrants from Zimbabwe, taking about 20-25% of
the annual total.
The so-called “brain drain” has been a major migration issue in
Zimbabwe during the past three decades. Table 1.5 shows the losses and
gains in skilled personnel classified according to major occupational cat-
egories of economically active emigrants and immigrants respectively
between 1980 and 1997. Overall, the country had a net loss of almost
23,500 economically active persons over the period 1980 to 1997. The
largest losses took place in the early years after independence when, for
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Table 1.4: Emigrants from Zimbabwe by Region and Country of Destination Declared on 
Departure, 1980-1997 (%)
Region and 1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1994- 1996-
Country 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Africa Total 78.2 76.6 70.6 52.8 59.2 38.7 33.8 40.0 48.4
South Africa 62.4 52.6 40.9 16.3 20.4 13.1 7.7 12.5 15.7
Zambia 3.7 2.8 4.3 5.3 3.3 2.4 3.5 2.0 5.2
Malawi 8.1 17.1 21.2 24.8 27.5 7.7 10.3 8.0 11.4
Mozambique 1.1 1.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9
Elsewhere 2.9 2.5 3.4 5.5 7.2 14.2 10.8 15.9 14.2
Americas Total 3.0 2.6 3.7 9.9 6.7 13.4 17.1 15.5 11.7
USA 1.9 1.6 2.6 4.7 4.2 7.6 9.5 9.9 10.4
Canada 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.7 2.1 2.6 2.7 1.7 1.0
Elsewhere 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.5 0.4 3.2 4.9 3.9 0.3
Asia Total 0.6 1.2 2.7 4.2 3.4 5.7 6.0 3.2 4.2
India 0.2 0.4 1.3 2.4 2.2 1.3 1.9 0.6 0.7
Elsewhere 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.2 4.4 4.1 2.6 3.5
Europe Total 13.7 14.8 19.1 28.6 25.3 35.0 38.2 36.0 31.8
UK 11.0 11.4 14.2 20.1 17.8 23.8 26.8 25.3 22.1
Germany 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.7 2.3 3.0 2.2 2.1
Elsewhere 2.1 2.6 3.9 6.9 5.8 8.9 8.4 8.5 7.6
Oceania Total 4.3 4.7 3.3 4.3 5.1 6.7 4.7 4.8 3.5
Australia 3.9 4.2 2.8 3.5 4.4 6.1 3.8 3.8 3.0
Elsewhere 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.5
Not Stated 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.4
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total # 37,774 37,009 23,897 9,117 8,870 8,255 5,671 6,755 3,450
Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
instance, there was a net loss of 16,083 economically active people in
the four years 1980-83. The largest numbers of movements over the
period were among the professional and technical category where some
19,300 people emigrated. However, an almost equal number came to
work in the country for varying periods of time. The occupational cate-
gories to experience the largest net losses were production and related
workers, with a net loss of 8,375, followed by clerical and related work-
ers where there was a net loss of 7,571 workers.
Government has made various attempts to curtail the loss of skills,
including the bonding of graduates from local and foreign universities
and technical colleges, but to no avail. Initially, whites who had
enjoyed substantial educational and training benefits during the colo-
nial period, left in large numbers from the late 1970s, primarily for
South Africa. Their positions in the public and private sectors of the
economy were usually taken over by well-educated but less experienced
blacks (some of whom were returning residents) and by expatriate work-
ers from other regions of the world such as the United Kingdom, India,
East and West Africa.5 More recently, black Zimbabweans, especially
highly qualified professionals, have been leaving the country for work in
South Africa and Botswana where salaries are much higher than at
home and inflation is lower. While there is circumstantial evidence that
many of these professional people eventually return to work in
Zimbabwe after a few years, they nonetheless represent a loss to the
country during the time that they are away, and often they have to be
replaced temporarily with more expensive expatriate professionals.
1.3 VISITORS TO ZIMBABWE
By the late 1990s some 80% of visitors came on holiday, while around
10% came on business (Table 1.6). Throughout the 1980s, the number
of business visitors ranged between 40,000 and 50,000 per year. In the
1990s, the number of business visitors increased quite considerably, from
67,994 in 1992 to reach 93,525 in 1994 and 249,669 in 1997. 
The fluctuations in the numbers of visitors coming on holiday over
the past two decades illustrate the sensitivity of the tourism industry to
political and civil disturbances and economic downturns. Overall,
annual tourist arrivals increased from 22,7195 in 1980 to well over one
million by the late 1990s, but the growth has been uneven from year to
year.6 For instance, the immediate post-independence growth in tourist
arrivals received a major setback when, in 1982, a party of six foreign
tourists were abducted between Bulawayo and Victoria Falls and subse-
quently killed by a gang of anti-government dissidents. Over the period
to 1987, the western half of the country in particular was plagued by
ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE: PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN ZIMBABWE
14
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 25
15
Ta
bl
e 
1.
5:
O
cc
up
at
io
ns
 o
f E
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 A
ct
iv
e 
M
ig
ra
nt
s 
by
 
M
ajo
r O
cc
up
ati
on
al 
Ca
teg
or
ies
,1
98
0-
19
97
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l 
19
80
-1
98
3
19
84
-1
98
7
19
88
-1
99
1
19
92
-1
99
5
19
96
-1
99
7
To
ta
l 1
98
0-
19
97
Ca
te
go
ry
1
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
 
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
Im
m
i-
Em
i-
N
et
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
gr
an
t
gr
an
t
Ch
an
ge
Pr
of
e
ss
io
na
l &
5,
47
5
7,
00
1
-
1,
52
6
4,
63
0
4,
47
4
15
6
4,
04
5
37
2
31
8
3,
53
3
3,
34
9
18
4
14
75
79
0
68
5
19
,1
58
19
,3
41
-
18
3
te
ch
ni
ca
l2
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e
 
85
5
2,
05
9
-
1,
20
4
44
2
88
1
-
43
9
46
6
54
3
-
77
76
9
68
8
10
1
46
1
20
9
25
2
2,
99
3
4,
38
0
-
1,
38
7
& 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
Cl
er
ic
al
 &
 
1,
38
7
6,
02
9
-
4,
64
2
47
1
1,
95
1
-
1,
48
0
22
7
1,
15
7
-
93
0
24
7
67
1
-
42
4
53
14
8
-
95
2,
38
5
9,
95
6
-
7,
57
1
re
la
te
d 
wo
rk
e
rs
Sa
le
s 
wo
rk
e
rs
35
3
1,
10
9
-
75
6
14
0
35
2
-
21
2
49
17
7
-
12
8
18
1
21
5
-
34
18
2
78
10
4
90
5
1,
93
1
-
1,
02
6
Se
rv
ice
 w
or
ke
rs
31
8
1,
42
8
-
1,
11
0
14
1
70
8
-
56
7
81
23
5
-
15
4
91
22
2
-
13
1
32
69
-
37
66
3
2,
66
2
-
1,
99
9
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l 
31
2
1,
05
5
-
74
3
19
3
55
2
-
35
9
12
8
24
4
-
11
4
11
3
11
7
-
4
44
58
-
14
79
0
2,
02
6
-
1,
23
6
w
o
rk
e
rs
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
2,
30
7
7,
15
8
-
4,
85
1
1,
11
1
3,
34
0
-
2,
22
9
42
7
1,
45
2
-
1,
02
5
40
5
63
9
-
23
4
14
8
18
4
-
36
4,
39
8
12
,7
73
-
8,
37
5
w
o
rk
e
rs
3
Ar
m
e
d 
fo
rc
e
s
n
.a
.
n
.a
.
n
.a
.
48
16
5
-
11
7
19
81
-
62
11
64
-
53
49
3
28
9
20
4
57
1
59
9
-
28
In
ad
eq
ua
te
ly 
54
7
1,
79
8
-
1,
25
1
14
8
52
5
-
37
7
14
6
17
2
-
26
33
3
35
6
-
23
7
10
-
3
1,
18
1
2,
86
1
-
1,
68
0
o
r 
n
o
t s
ta
te
d
To
ta
l
11
,5
54
27
,6
37
-
16
,0
83
7,
32
4
12
,9
48
-
5,
62
4
5,
58
8
7,
78
8
-
2,
20
0
5,
68
3
6,
32
1
-
63
8
2,
89
5
1,
83
5
1,
06
0
33
,0
44
56
,5
29
-
23
,4
85
N
ot
e:
1.
Th
e 
fig
ur
es
 s
ho
w
 th
e 
re
po
rte
d 
oc
cu
pa
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 m
ig
ra
n
ts
.
Th
ey
 a
re
 s
ub
jec
t to
 er
ror
 w
he
re 
mi
gra
n
ts
 d
id
 n
ot
 s
ta
te
 th
ei
r o
cc
up
at
io
ns
 c
or
re
ct
ly
2.
In
cl
ud
es
 s
cie
nt
ist
s,
 
e
n
gi
ne
er
s,
 
a
rc
hi
te
ct
s 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
te
ch
ni
cia
ns
,
 
m
e
di
ca
l, 
de
nt
al
 a
nd
 re
la
te
d 
wo
rk
e
rs
,
 
a
cc
o
u
n
ta
nt
s 
an
d 
te
ac
he
rs
3.
In
cl
ud
es
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
wo
rk
e
rs
 in
 m
an
u
fa
ct
ur
in
g,
 m
in
in
g 
an
d 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n 
in
du
st
rie
s
So
ur
ce
s:
CS
O
 M
ig
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
To
u
ris
t S
ta
tis
tic
s
political and civil unrest which in turn was combined with negative for-
eign media publicity about the country. Consequently, the number of
foreign visitors arriving on holiday fell by 28%, from 327,261 in 1981 to
23,5726 in 1983. From the late 1980s, the numbers of arrivals began to
rise again, except for 1988 following the severe drought of 1987-88.
By far the majority of visitors come from within Africa, and especial-
ly from South Africa and Zambia (Table 1.7). South Africa, together
with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, accounts for between
30% and 40% of the visitors to Zimbabwe each year, followed closely by
Zambia. In recent years, Mozambique has grown in importance as a
source of visitors to Zimbabwe, and now contributes up to 10% of the
annual total. Its growing significance since the late 1980s may be attrib-
uted to the cessation of civil war in that country which has promoted
freer movement of people. 
Outside Africa, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
have been the leading sources of visitors to Zimbabwe. This is explained
by the long historical, socio-cultural, political and economic ties
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Table 1.6: Visitors to Zimbabwe by Purpose of Visit, 1980-1997
Year On Business On Holiday In Transit Educational Total Visitors
1980 40,766 227,195 4,953 457 273,371
1981 44,318 327,261 10,920 857 383,356
1982 39,993 290,681 19,306 1,066 351,046
1983 40,022 235,726 21,177 1,116 298,041
1984 33,022 277,577 23,055 944 339,598
1985 41,074 319,826 27,819 746 389,465
1986 48,512 345,640 38,281 939 433,372
1987 47,838 405,842 32,937 1,099 487,716
1988 53,642 395,593 37,118 2,609 488,962
1989 52,074 411,243 38,087 2,844 504,248
1990 52,932 527,190 53,190 2,480 635,792
1991 46,093 587,129 59,983 3,454 696,659
1992 67,994 629,466 62,251 6266 765,978
1993 136,647 732,645 93,419 8,828 971,539
1994 93,522 937,212 100,078 8,243 1,139,055
1995 130,135 1,268,580 166,111 16,820 1,581,646
1996 133,122 1,410,847 196,189 52,727 1,792,885
1997 249,669 1,075,573 213,888 10,338 1,549,468
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom. The two European coun-
tries account for 6-7% of the total number of visitors each year. Other
leading source countries in Europe are Germany, the Netherlands and
Switzerland.
1.4 ZIMBABWEANS VISITING ABROAD
For Zimbabwean residents going abroad for periods not exceeding 12
months at a time, Africa is by far the dominant destination, accounting
for some 90% of documented departing residents. Within the continent,
South Africa is the most popular destination for Zimbabwean residents.
Each year, some 40-60% of Zimbabwean residents travelling abroad go to
South Africa. This is due to the long historical, political, economic and
socio-cultural links that have existed between the two countries. South
Africa is Zimbabwe’s leading trading partner in the world, hence there is
a lot of movement for purposes of trade by the commercial and industrial
sectors of the country. Both black and white Zimbabwean residents have
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Table 1.7: Visitors to Zimbabwe by Region and Country of Permanent Residence, 1980-1997
Region & 1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1994- 1996-
Country 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 19912 19932 1995 1997
Africa Total 83.4 78.7 78.7 80.3 79.0 82.2 85.1 85.1 76.5
Southern Africa1 41.4 38.1 39.6 31.6 36.7 39.1 47.7 38.5 33.4
Zambia 36.3 33.2 30.0 38.6 30.2 29.6 26.8 35.0 28.1
Mozambique 0.9 1.9 3.6 4.6 6.5 7.3 5.2 6.6 10.0
Elsewhere 4.8 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.2 5.4 5.0 5.0
Americas Total 2.9 4.3 4.9 3.8 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.8
USA & Canada 2.7 4.1 4.6 3.5 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.2 3.2
Elsewhere 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6
Asia Total 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2
Europe Total 12.0 14.5 13.7 13.2 14.3 12.0 10.2 9.9 15.8
UK & Ireland 6.7 7.3 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.2 4.8 4.3 6.6
Germany3 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.0 3.4
Elsewhere 3.7 5.2 4.9 4.7 5.5 4.1 3.5 3.6 5.8
Oceania Total 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.7 1.8 2.7
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total No. 640,854 608,604 676,029 849,870 918,005 1,332,451 1,737,517 2,720,701 2,932,276
Note:
1. Includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
2. Figures for the three years 1990/91, 1992/93 and 1994/95 include visitors in transit 
3. Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
close relations across the border and this also explains some of these
movements (Table 1.8). 
Since the late 1980s, there has developed a large flow of informal
cross-border trading by low-income people, especially women, who trav-
el to South Africa to purchase goods for subsequent resale when they
return to Zimbabwe.7 This cross-border informal trade has developed
against a background of deteriorating economic conditions in Zimbabwe
during the past decade. The economic decline has forced many low and
middle income households to engage in informal trading in order to
supplement their family incomes, despite attempts by the South African
authorities to curtail this traffic by imposing stringent conditions on
those applying for entry visas into that country. A recent study showed
that two-thirds of the Zimbabwean women who had visited South
Africa during the past five years went there for the purpose of trading
(i.e. taking goods for sale and buying goods for subsequent resale when
they returned home).8 Almost two-thirds of the female respondents in
the survey had stayed for up to two weeks and 87% said they had spent
up to four weeks on their visits to South Africa. On the other hand,
men tended to go to South Africa less often, their average stay was
somewhat longer, and 20% said they had been looking for a job or had
actually worked there, compared with one-third who said they had gone
there for the purpose of trading.
Other popular destinations within Africa for Zimbabwean residents
travelling abroad are Zambia and Botswana, while Mozambique has
grown in popularity during the past few years. The latter country has
now become a destination for some 7% of the local travellers, from less
than 3% a decade ago. Some of the movements to Botswana,
Mozambique and Zambia are also for purposes of informal trading, the
two latter countries being popular for trading in second-hand clothing
and foodstuffs. 
Outside Africa, Europe is the most popular destination, with the
largest proportion of the travellers going to the United Kingdom.
Destinations in Asia, the Americas and Oceania account for only a very
small proportion of Zimbabwean travellers, partly because of the large
distances and high costs of air travel involved. The few residents going
to destinations in Oceania mainly go to Australia. Some of these trav-
ellers are white Zimbabweans visiting their relatives who emigrated to
that country especially during the 1970s and 1980s at a time of major
political change in Zimbabwe.
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1.5 UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION
Parallel with the growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indi-
cations that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration
from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly
since the 1980s. Unauthorized migrants fall into two categories. The
first are those Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries, mostly
Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then over-
stay after expiry of their entry visas. The second category comprises those
who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel documents and do not use offi-
cial exit points. Not only do these over-staying and undocumented
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Table 1.8: Zimbabwean Residents Visiting Abroad by Region and Country of Destination, 1980-
1997
Region & 1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1994- 1996-
Country 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Africa Total 90.1 90.8 91.3 88.9 87.2 88.1 89.4 87.5 85.8
South Africa 63.8 52.8 48.3 56.8 52.5 58.7 70.3 38.1 34.4
Zambia 6.9 7.9 6.6 11.2 10.1 7.2 5.1 12.6 21.1
Malawi 3.3 4.5 5.5 7.5 10.1 4.9 5.1 4.7 10.1
Mozambique 0.8 0.9 0.9 2.4 4.7 4.2 4.1 7.7 7.4
Botswana 13.9 22.8 28 8.1 6.8 8.8 1.9 20.5 8.8
Elsewhere 1.4 1.9 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.3 2.9 3.9 4.0
Americas Total 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.9
USA 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.4
Canada 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4
Elsewhere 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.1
Asia Total 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.5
Europe Total 7.2 7.3 6.9 8.8 9.4 9.3 9.3 10.6 11.4
UK 5.2 5.2 4.9 6.3 6.8 7.3 8.4 8.1 9.4
Germany 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6
Elsewhere 1.8 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.4 0.6 1.8 1.4
Oceania Total 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4
Australia 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
Elsewhere 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04
Not Stated 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.5 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total No. 651,831 682,807 538,104 331,282 280,785 551,313 952,657 430,613 192,634
Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics
migrants seek to secure employment in the host countries, but some
even manage to obtain South African or Botswana citizenship and
other official documents fraudulently.9 Initially, most of the unautho-
rized migrants came from the southern and western districts of
Zimbabwe, areas prone to recurrent droughts and severe food shortages.
Civil unrest during the 1980s also drove many young people from their
rural homes. Today the migrants come from all parts of the country,
including the northern districts that are considerable distances from
South Africa. 
There are no reliable statistics on the numbers of undocumented
Zimbabwean migrants staying in South Africa and Botswana.10 The
magnitude of this migration stream can only be inferred indirectly from
the available official sources. The best available data are statistics com-
piled by the South African government as follows: (a) the number of
over-stayers, defined as those who entered the country legally but for
whom there are no records of their subsequent departure, and (b) the
number of people deported from South Africa either because they had
over-stayed their entry permit or because they had entered illegally in
the first instance. 
The number of Zimbabwean overstayers still in South Africa increas-
es steadily the closer we get to the present (Table 1.9). There was a
marked increase in the number of over-stayers in the mid-1990s, proba-
bly associated with the political changes in South Africa and the result-
ant greater willingness among foreigners to seek their fortunes in that
country. The number of people deported has remained fairly constant
during the past few years at between 15,000 and 20,000 each year
(Table 1.10). As a proportion of the total number of deportees from
South Africa, Zimbabwe’s share has also remained stable at around 10%
of total deportations per annum. 
It is necessary to qualify these statistics by noting that some of the
deportees return to South Africa and Botswana almost as soon as they
have paid their deposit fines with the Zimbabwean police. Thus, there
is a lot of circulatory movement by the same people such that the actual
number of people who are entering legally and staying illegally in South
Africa or Botswana may well be lower than the numbers of deportations
given in Table 1.10. The numbers of over-stayers in Table 1.9 are also
similar to the estimate given by the South African High Commission in
Harare which reported in 1998 that about 75,000 Zimbabweans were
believed to be staying in South Africa illegally after their temporary res-
idence visas had expired.11
People who leave Zimbabwe other than through official exit ports,
on being deported by the South African or Botswana authorities, risk a
fine which stands at Z$100. This is apparently not a sufficient deterrent
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and the Department of Immigration Control has recently recommend-
ed that the fine should be increased to Z$1000. A report in a local
newspaper illustrates the failure of the current fine to serve as a deter-
rent. It was reported that many Zimbabweans living in South Africa
had failed to cross the flooded Limpopo River shortly before Christmas
of 1998:12
Unperturbed, many sauntered across the bridge (at the
Beitbridge border post) carrying their gifts, turned them-
selves in to the police, paid $100 deposit fines and went
home. Now they want to go back to work and have to do it
the hard way, by sneaking across the river and walking
through the Kruger National Park. Already hundreds of
border jumpers are strung along the northern bank of the
river waiting for it to subside.
Commenting on the returning undocumented migrants, a senior
police officer at Beitbridge had earlier been quoted as saying: “It seems
most of them are prepared because they are coming with their fines
ready which they pay before proceeding home.”13
According to local media reports, unauthorized cross-border migra-
tion reaches a peak towards the end of the year when those people who
have been living and working in South Africa or Botswana return home
for Christmas.14 After spending a few weeks with family and friends at
home, they make their journey across the border again. Unfortunately,
this period coincides with the rainy season and some of them have
attempted to cross the flooded Limpopo River, often with tragic conse-
quences from the floods and crocodiles.15 One newspaper reported that
at least 33 people, including several women, had died while attempting
to cross the Limpopo River during the 1997-98 rainy season.16
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Table 1.9: Zimbabwean Overstayers in South Africa, 1997
Length of Time in South Africa Number of Overstayers
< 1 year 27,909
1-2 years 18,507
2-3 years 12,554
3-4 years 10,888
4-5 years 8,421
> 5 years 495
Total 78,774
1.6 GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS MIGRATION
After independence in 1980, the black majority government adopted a
policy of selective immigration whose basic tenet was to ensure that
black Zimbabweans were not disadvantaged in terms of employment in
favour of white immigrants. Issues of immigration and citizenship in
independent Zimbabwe are governed by three principal pieces of legisla-
tion, namely the Immigration Act (Chapter 4:02), the Refugees Act
(Chapter 4:03) and the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 4:01).
Section 41 of the Immigration Act empowers the Minister of Home
Affairs to promulgate regulations to govern the entry and exit of people
into and out of Zimbabwe and to determine the conditions under which
non-Zimbabweans can stay in the country. Current immigration regula-
tions were gazetted in August 1998 as Statutory Instrument 195 of
1998. 
Persons wanting to come to Zimbabwe for purposes of employment
are normally allowed entry only if the prospective employers can show
to the satisfaction of the Foreign Recruitment Committee that the
required skills are not available locally and that they have been unable
to recruit from within the country. The prospective immigrant is then
granted a residence permit and temporary employment permit allowing
them to work only for that particular organization and for a limited
period of time (usually 2-3 years in the first instance). The temporary
employment permit will normally not be granted for a period exceeding
five years, including any periods of renewal. The holder of a temporary
employment permit is not allowed to change occupations or employers
during the period specified in the permit. In the meantime, the employ-
ing organization is expected to put in place a training programme for a
Zimbabwean resident to understudy the expatriate worker. This policy
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Table 1.10: Zimbabwean Deportees from South Africa, 1990-1997
Year Deportations
Zimbabwean Deportees Total Deportees Zimbabwean Deportees as % of Total
1990 5,363 53,445 10.0
1991 7,174 61,345 11.7
1992 12,033 82,575 14.6
1993 10,961 96,697 11.3
1994 12,931 90,682 14.3
1995 17,549 157,075 11.2
1996 14,651 180,704 8.1
1997 21,673 176,349 12.3
Source: Southern African Migration Project database (SAMP)17
of “immigration control” explains the significant increase in the category
of immigrants classified as temporary residents from the early 1980s
when they constituted less than 10% of the annual number of immi-
grants to over three-quarters by the late 1990s. Permanent residence is
normally not granted until a person has been resident in Zimbabwe for at
least five years. Citizenship is granted upon application to persons who
have been resident in Zimbabwe, whether continuously or as an aggre-
gate of the number of periods, for at least five years. Dual citizenship is
not permitted and therefore those intending to become Zimbabwean cit-
izens must renounce any other citizenship that they may hold.
In order to attract foreign direct investment, immigration regulations
give special consideration to people who invest substantial sums of
money in projects approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Centre. Thus,
a permanent residence permit will be granted with immediate effect to
an applicant who has transferred US$1 million or more into Zimbabwe
for the purpose of investment. A three-year residence permit may be
issued to a person who invests US$300,000 or more and, after a success-
ful viability study, a permanent residence permit may be issued just
before the expiry of the original three-year residence permit.
The government also has bilateral agreements with neighbouring
countries to facilitate the movement of people who are resident in bor-
der regions. These bilateral agreements exist with Botswana in the west,
South Africa in the south, Mozambique in the east and with Zambia in
the north. In essence, residents in the border regions are registered and
issued with temporary passes that enable them to cross the border to
visit friends and relatives on the other side and, in the case of the bor-
der with South Africa, to seek employment in the Northern Province of
that country. The residents are allowed to travel up to a distance of 20
km into the interior of the host country on these temporary passes.
Many Mozambicans and Zambians who are resident in the border
regions of their respective countries also enter Zimbabwe in the east
and north respectively in order to shop for commodities that are
unavailable in their own countries. Other bilateral agreements with
neighbouring countries pertain to matters of joint security and defence.
Zimbabwe is one of the founding members of the Southern African
Development Community which was originally established in 1980 as
the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
(SADCC). During the 1980s, the principal objective of the SADCC
was to dismantle apartheid and to reduce the economic dependence of
the member countries on South Africa. Following the end of apartheid
and the ascent to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in
South Africa in 1994, the role and long term objectives of SADCC
were transformed from being political (i.e. disengagement from
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apartheid South Africa) to economic development and regional integra-
tion of the member countries. In pursuit of this new economic goal, the
organization changed its name to the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). One of theinitial goals of the re-constituted
regional grouping was to develop a common policy regulating the move-
ment of nationals between SADC member countries. To this end, a
Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) was submitted for consider-
ation by the governments of member countries in early 1996. The
short-term objectives of the protocol were to facilitate for citizens of the
member states (a) entry without a visa into the territory of another
member state for a period of three months at a time; (b) residence in
the territory of another member state; and (c) establishment of oneself
and working in the territory of another member state. The long-term
objective was to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination
of obstacles to the movement of people of the region generally into and
within the territories of the member states.18
The Zimbabwean government was generally in agreement with the
protocol and would have liked to have seen its provisions implemented
as proposed at the earliest opportunity. It had already implemented
some of the provisions of the protocol ahead of its potential adoption by
the regional group as a whole. For instance, a separate “SADC desk” at
the major ports of entry to process holders of passports issued by mem-
ber states has been in existence for a few years now. Secondly, there are
already no entry visa requirements for holders of most SADC passports
except South Africa and Mozambique. Discussions with Zimbabwean
government officials indicate some dissatisfaction with the South
African attitude towards the issue of entry visas. The South African
government tightened its immigration control regulations on
Zimbabwean passport holders from October 1996.19 In contrast, from
February 1996, South African passport holders were able to obtain entry
visas into Zimbabwe at the port of entry instead of having to apply for
them prior to departure. Thirdly, in December 1998, a new “technologi-
cally sensitive” passport with improved security features was introduced,
in compliance with Article 11 of the revised (May 1998) draft
protocol.20
However, despite Zimbabwe’s support for the Draft Protocol, it has
never been ratified. Opposition from South Africa, Botswana and, to a
lesser extent, Namibia accounts for that. Even a watered-down version
of the original protocol failed to move the opponents of free
movement.21 Free movement therefore continues in practice but a
regionally-coordinated approach to migration management seems as
elusive as ever.
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1.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an overview of population movements in
Zimbabwe, both within and outside the country, with particular focus
on the post-independence years. It has described these various migra-
tion patterns and sought to provide explanations for these movements.
It is hoped that a better understanding of these population movements,
particularly cross-border or regional migrations between Zimbabwe and
its neighbours, will contribute towards the formulation of a more
humane and more progressive (im)migration policy regime not only for
Zimbabwe but for all the member countries of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) as they strive towards economic
integration and the freer regional movement of their citizens.
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CHAPTER TWO
CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT FROM ZIMBABWE TO
SOUTH AFRICA22
LOVEMORE ZINYAMA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen growing numbers of Zimbabweansgoing to South Africa, Botswana and, to a lesser extent,Mozambique and Zambia, some to engage in small-scale trad-ing and others in search of employment. The types, patterns,
causes and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migra-
tion are complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as
yet about who travels outside the country, why and how often. This
chapter seeks to address some of these questions based on the results of
a nationwide survey of a large, randomly selected population of
Zimbabweans. 
The chapter begins by outlining the current harsh economic condi-
tions affecting many in Zimbabwe and the range of strategies which
people, especially in lower-income households, use to cope with these
difficulties. A brief description of methodology is then followed by a
presentation of the data, with a focus on those respondents who have
been to South Africa in the past. While the number of people who
have travelled to South Africa in the past is relatively small compared
to the total sample size, it is shown that, among those who have been,
trade is a primary reason. The report then discusses differences in cross-
border activity among those who have previously travelled to South
Africa, addressing questions such as who goes (in terms of age, marital
status, education, etc.), frequency of travel and length of stay in South
Africa, modes of transport used, and why they go there. 
It is suggested that a better understanding of the nature of cross-bor-
der movement between Zimbabwe and South Africa would assist in the
adoption of a more enlightened policy in South Africa than is envis-
aged in the atmosphere of xenophobia that has prevailed for the past
few years.
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2.2 COPING WITH ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS IN ZIMBABWE
Cross-border migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa has histor-
ically been only a male activity. This was partly because it was deemed
both too far and too risky for women in pre-independence Zimbabwe to
travel to South Africa on their own, and partly because migration was
strictly regulated by the requirements of the South African mines for
labour from north of the Limpopo River.23 But during the past decade,
political and economic conditions have changed considerably in both
countries. In South Africa, the pariah apartheid state is no more and
the country is now a full member of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and of the Commonwealth.24 In Zimbabwe, eco-
nomic conditions have deteriorated so much that people, especially
those from lower- and middle-income households, are finding it neces-
sary to adopt a wide range of strategies for coping with these hardships.
As a result, women can no longer remain recipients of their husbands’
wages while staying at home and are having to go out to look for work
in the formal and informal domestic sectors, while others travel to
South Africa and elsewhere in an effort to support their families.
Economic growth since the mid-1980s has been slow and erratic in
Zimbabwe, with high and growing levels of unemployment. Apparently
under pressure for balance of payment support from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government reluctant-
ly abandoned the socialist policies which it had pursued since independ-
ence in 1980 and started in 1991 to implement liberalization policy
reforms under the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP).25
Under the reform programme, the government undertook to reduce
public expenditure by, among other things, removing subsidies on basic
foodstuffs, reducing budgetary allocations even to essential social servic-
es such as education and health care, and downsizing the public service.
According to the ESAP policy document, the objectives of the pro-
gramme were to ensure higher medium- and long-term economic
growth, to reduce poverty and improve living conditions especially for
the poorest groups, and to address the problems of burgeoning unem-
ployment.26
Ten years after the start of ESAP, unemployment continues to wors-
en and has in fact been compounded by retrenchments in both the pub-
lic and private sectors. Both local and foreign investment have not been
forthcoming as initially envisaged; many large firms have closed down
and there is strong evidence of de-industrialization due to increased
competition from imports. Price inflation has also spiralled. Over
50,000 people were retrenched by private sector companies alone with
the approval of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social
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Welfare during the period 1991-1997.27 Many other firms were retrench-
ing labour without reporting to the ministry. During the same period,
the government cut the number of public service employees by over
23,000.28 In a country of about 12.5 million, where less than one million
people are in formal employment, these reductions represent significant
losses in family incomes. Not surprisingly, the umbrella Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) reported that its membership had
dropped from 1.5 million in 1992 to less than one million by 1998.29
According to most commentators, Zimbabweans are worse off today
than they were at independence in 1980. Available evidence suggests
that the economic reform programme has brought little but economic
hardship, not only for the poorest groups, but also to middle-income
households, in both rural and urban areas.30 ESAP has failed to deliver
on the economic benefits that it promised. For instance, the country
has seen the considerable advances made in social service delivery dur-
ing the 1980s eroded as the government has implemented cost recovery
measures in such sectors as education and health care even for the poor.
From a position of offering free primary education for all children and
free health care for the poorest during the 1980s, the re-introduction of
high user charges has led to a denial of access to these services for many
households in both rural and urban areas. For the growing army of these
vulnerable groups, the deterioration in their economic situation has
been compounded by the recurrent droughts that have hit the country,
and indeed the whole of Southern Africa, since the early 1980s.
The people of Zimbabwe, particularly the lower-income groups, have
devised a variety of strategies for coping with these economic hardships.
In urban areas, the most apparent coping strategy is seen in the massive
expansion of informal sector activities such as petty commodity trading
and manufacturing, and the provision of services such as public com-
muter transport. Cultivation on any available undeveloped piece of
urban public land is now widespread as both low- and middle-income
households seek to supplement their food supplies and family incomes.31
Many in formal employment now commonly resort to “moonlighting”
in order to supplement their wages. Homeowners let out “rooms” or put
up additional structures on their properties to accommodate rent-paying
lodgers. The latter phenomenon has become widespread in all urban
centres, affecting not only low-income residential areas but also middle-
income suburbs.
Another coping strategy involves cross-border travel for informal
trade in neighbouring countries. Since the mid-1980s, large numbers of
Zimbabweans have been going to Botswana and South Africa with vari-
ous items, notably crotchet ware, for sale in those countries. This cross-
border trade has increasingly become dominated by women seeking to
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supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children.32
The money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods
for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those
known to be in short supply at home. During the 1980s, before the
relaxation of foreign currency controls by the government as part of the
economic reform programme, these cross-border traders are known to
have been key players in supplying commerce and industry with scarce
requirements such as spare motor vehicle parts for electrical appliances
and small items of machinery. More recently, female Zimbabwean cross-
border traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far
as Tanzania to purchase and bring home for resale secondhand clothing,
some of it reportedly brought into those countries by European charita-
ble organizations for distribution to the needy.
While some people choose to engage only in circulatory cross-border
trading, others migrate for varying periods of time to seek employment
in South Africa or Botswana. This migration includes both the poorly
educated without skills as well as highly qualified professional people. A
1998 ILO study, quoting the Zimbabwe High Commission in Pretoria,
gave an estimate of 60,000 migrants working in South Africa in profes-
sional positions such as teachers, university academics, doctors, nurses,
engineers, and accountants.33 On the other hand, some of the unskilled
migrants can only hope to get jobs as exploited and underpaid domestic
workers and farm labourers in areas like the Northern Province of
South Africa. They cross the border legally, if they have valid passports,
entry visas and work permits; or they may enter South Africa without
valid entry documents. Likewise, they return home to their families at
Christmas and New Year either legally or “illegally.” Such cross-border
migration is thought to be common especially in the southern and west-
ern districts of the country, close to the border with South Africa and
Botswana.
While the governments of Zambia and Mozambique have not pub-
licly expressed concern about the movement of people from Zimbabwe
and have not taken any actions to curtail such movements where these
are done legally, this has not been the case with South Africa or, to a
lesser extent, Botswana. In South Africa, the years since the end of
apartheid in 1994 have seen growing xenophobia within the local press
and the general public directed at foreign nationals, particularly those
from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This xenophobia has often culminat-
ed in physical violence directed against foreigners and their property.34
Common stereotypes are that these foreigners are coming in vast
numbers, both legally and “illegally”, and that they are a threat to the
economic prosperity and security of the country.35 Zimbabweans and
others are seen as taking away jobs from South Africans, thereby adding
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to the unemployment of South African nationals and, by accepting
lower wages, depressing renumeration for local labour.36 This stereotyp-
ing extends to trade in the informal sector where foreigners are accused
of taking away business from South African hawkers and vendors
through increased competition. Foreigners, particularly undocumented
migrants, have also been accused of gunrunning and drug trafficking,
and being responsible for the increased level of violent crime in South
Africa. They are accused of placing a burden on South Africa’s health
and educational services because those in their own countries have
been allowed to collapse by their own national governments.37
Another common stereotype in South Africa is that foreign nation-
als are coming to the country because of political repression, civil unrest
and economic chaos in their home countries, or because they want to
enjoy the benefits of the most enlightened and democratic constitution
in Africa. 38 In the words of the former Deputy Minister of Home
Affairs, Penuel Maduna, “hunger and fear are driving forces that are
much stronger than even the most sophisticated aliens control measures
... South Africa has become the country of survival for many people
from countries within Africa, and also from other parts of the world”.39
According to the South African Minister of Home Affairs, not only do
foreign men take South African women and engage in marriages of con-
venience, but they also bring in diseases, notably STDs and HIV.40
These misleading assertions about foreigners in South Africa have been
well documented by SAMP.41
Estimates of the number of undocumented foreigners in South Africa
vary from 500,000 to 8 million. According to the South African High
Commission in Harare, about 75,000 Zimbabweans were believed to be
staying “illegally” in South Africa after the expiry of their temporary
residence permits during 1997, while an additional unknown number
had entered and remained there without legal documentation.42 This
figure is very close to the figure of 78,774 supplied by the South African
Department of Home Affairs (Table 1.9). The Zimbabwean High
Commission in Pretoria estimated in 1997 that some 400,000
Zimbabweans, including both legal and undocumented migrants, might
be working as domestics, farm labourers and in the construction indus-
try, sectors known to employ large numbers of foreign workers.43 The fig-
ure seems exaggerated and certainly the South African police cannot
find them, judging by the deportation figures (Table 1.10).
In order to counter the inflow of foreigners, the South African gov-
ernment has tried to impose stringent controls on their entry into the
country, particularly of the less educated and unskilled, and only selec-
tively allows entry to those with skills and capital for investment in the
country.44 Undocumented migrants, either because they entered the
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country unlawfully in the first instance or because they overstayed the
time stipulated in their original entry permits, are rounded up and
deported. This public perception of foreigners as parasites appears to
have substantial support among senior politicians and officials within
the Department of Home Affairs, the police, and other arms of govern-
ment responsible for implementing the country’s immigration policies
and border control. But it remains unclear how true these fears are that
Zimbabweans, together with other foreigners, are queuing to enter
South Africa in large numbers and causing considerable harm to that
country’s prosperity and security. We therefore need to get a clear sense
of the numbers of Zimbabweans who are entering South Africa, their
reasons for going there, how long they remain there and what their
long-term intentions are with regards to permanent settlement in that
country.
Unfortunately, objective assessment of these issues in South Africa
has been clouded by press hysteria that the country is about to be run
over by an army of “illegal aliens” who are waiting across the border in
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other countries north of the Limpopo
River, or who are already in the country.45 This paranoia is illustrated by
the tightening of immigration control regulations by the South African
High Commission in Harare on Zimbabwean passport holders from
October 1996, supposedly to curtail the numbers of people who were
overstaying upon the expiry of their entry visas. Applicants for entry
visas into South Africa are now required to produce proof of confirmed
and paid hotel accommodation or a letter of invitation from a business
associate, friend or relative legally resident in South Africa. The letter
would include detailed information on that person, including his/her
national identity number, physical address in South Africa, and the
length of the intended visit. Zimbabwean visitors are also required to
provide acceptable proof that they are able to sustain themselves while
in South Africa (e.g., bank statement or travellers’ cheques); produce a
letter from their employers to confirm that they are gainfully employed
in Zimbabwe and that they will return immediately upon completing
their business; and, for unemployed persons, proof of marriage in
Zimbabwe or an affidavit from a spouse. The last requirement is particu-
larly harsh and discriminatory against female travellers, especially single
women who are trying to support their families through cross-border
informal trading. (It is also of interest to note that immigration from
Europe and North America into the Cape Town area in recent years has
not been seen as a problem by South African officials). In contrast,
from February 1996, South African passport holders are now able to
obtain entry visas at the port of entry instead of having to apply to the
Zimbabwean High Commission in Pretoria before departure.
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2.3 SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The survey results presented in this chapter are based on interviews con-
ducted in February-March 1997. Thirty-two survey areas were randomly
selected from a list of national population census enumeration areas, 17
of them in rural areas and 15 in urban areas. There were somewhat more
male (56%) than female respondents (44%) in the sample. A profile of
the sample population is provided in Table 2.1. All the respondents
were Africans by race. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the
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Table 2.1: A Profile of the Sample Population in Zimbabwe
Number of interviews 947
Gender (%)
Male 56
Female 44
Race (%)
African 99
White -
Coloured -
Age (%)
15 - 24 26
25 - 44 50
45 - 64 17
65+ 6
Urban or Rural (%)
Urban 55
Rural 45
Marital Status (%)
Married 66
Separated/divorced/abandoned 5
Widowed 3
Unmarried 25
Household Status (%)
Household Head 34
Spouse 26
Child 20
Other family 7
Other 13
Note: Figures in tables may not add to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value of 
greater than zero but less than 0.5%.
size of the non-African population in Zimbabwe is very small, a mere
1.2% of the total population according to the results of the 1992
national population census. Second, the sample areas that were ran-
domly selected did not include the urban high-income suburbs or rural
large-scale commercial farms, the two areas where non-Africans gener-
ally live in Zimbabwe.
The sample obviously did not include those people who have already
moved to South Africa permanently or temporarily, and were therefore
not available for an interview. This caveat is important because it limits
the conclusions that can be drawn about why Zimbabweans go to South
Africa and what they do while they are there. In other words, one can-
not assume that the resident population of Zimbabwe has had the same
experiences as those Zimbabweans currently out of the country.
Nevertheless, the sample is drawn from a large, representative survey of
resident Zimbabweans and provides invaluable information about previ-
ous cross-border activities from one of South Africa’s largest neighbours.
2.4 WHO GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA?
Analysis of the data shows that only 22% of the respondents had been
to South Africa (210 people out of a total sample of 947). Of those who
had been to South Africa, men were only slightly more likely to have
visited than women. Thus, 23% of the males in the sample said they
had been to South Africa at least once in their lives, compared with
19% of the women. This result contradicts a public perception widely
held in Zimbabwe that it is now predominantly females who are partici-
pating in periodic cross-border movements for purposes of informal trad-
ing. However, there was a significant difference between males and
females in terms of usual place of residence. Urban women were almost
twice as likely to have been to South Africa than either their rural
counterparts or the male respondents. Two thirds of the females who
said they had visited South Africa were from urban areas, compared
with only 40% of the males.
For both males and females, the largest proportion of those who had
been to South Africa were in the 26-35 age group (Table 2.2). However,
87% of the females were under 45 years whereas males tended to be
more widely spread across all age groups. Almost three quarters of the
females were in the 26-45 category compared with only 49% of the
males. Among the older men who had been to South Africa are those
who had been there a long time ago as migrant mine workers and had
since returned home either because of old age or upon expiry of their
contracts. In the current situation of high unemployment and rampant
inflation, it is the younger age categories - both males and females, but
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more so females - with young families to support, who are likely to be
most hard hit and therefore to seek amelioration in many varied ways,
including cross-border migration.
Three quarters of both male and female respondents who had been
to South Africa were married (Table 2.3). Another 3% of the males and
9% of the females were either separated, divorced or widowed. Similar
results were obtained in a study of a rural community in southwestern
Zimbabwe with a high level of cross-border labour migration to South
Africa, where 72% of the migrants were married.46 Cross-border travel is
thus being done by persons with family responsibilities at home. This is
an important consideration for immigration policy formulation by the
South African and Zimbabwean authorities. Family responsibilities at
home are likely to weigh heavily against long-term or permanent migra-
tion to South Africa. As will be shown later, of crucial importance are
the length of stay in South Africa and the reasons for going there.
Twenty-six percent of the males and 15% of the female respondents
who had been to South Africa were single. Permanent or semi-perma-
nent migration, whether through legal or non-legal means, is more like-
ly to occur among this unmarried group with fewer social and family
responsibilities at home.
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Table2.2: Ages of Respondents Who Have Visited South Africa
Age Group Males (%) Females (%)
Up to 25 23 17
26 – 35 32 44
36 – 45 17 26
46 – 55 10 6
56 – 65 7 2
Over 65 10 1
Age unknown 1 4
N=264
Table 2.3: Marital Status of Respondents Who Have Visited South Africa
Marital Status Males (%) Females (%)
Married 71 75
Separated/divorced 2 5
Widowed 1 5
Never married 26 15
N=264
The questionnaire also sought information about the educational
qualifications of the respondents. Migration of educated people consti-
tutes a loss of human resources for the sending country; conversely, it
represents a significant economic gain to the receiving country. On the
other hand, if migration is only short-term or circulatory, there is no
detrimental transfer of human resources between the countries,
although it may have other socio-economic impacts on both sending
and receiving countries such as the trade balance or foreign exchange
transfers. The results from the survey show that the largest proportion of
both male and female respondents who had been to South Africa had
received some secondary school education (Table 2.4). Half the males
and 61% of the females had been educated up to secondary school level;
a further 8% and 2% respectively had been educated to tertiary level.
Not unexpectedly, a larger proportion of males than females had been
educated to tertiary level. Clearly, cross-border movement involves a
relatively well-educated segment of the Zimbabwean adult population
who are not only able to access the bureaucratic process of getting the
necessary travel documents before departure, but will be able to negoti-
ate their way in a foreign country.
There were notable differences between males and females in terms
of their employment status in Zimbabwe at the time of the survey. One
third of the males said that they were employed in the formal sector,
compared with only 10% of the females (Table 2.5). A little over half of
the males were unemployed, with nearly one quarter not actively look-
ing for work. On the other hand, almost 80% of the females were
unemployed and a little over half were not looking for work (including
homemakers). However, not more than 10% in both groups were
employed in the informal sector. Those people engaged in cross-border
export/import presumably do not see themselves as falling in the same
category as vendors and hawkers who spend the day selling their goods
from fixed or mobile stalls respectively.
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Table2.4: Highest Educational Level of Respondents Who Have Visited South Africa
Education Level Reached Males (%) Females (%)
No schooling 9 9
Some primary schooling 15 12
Completed primary school 19 16
Some high schooling 38 49
Completed high school 12 12
University/other tertiary 8 2
N=209
2.5 TIMES OF TRAVEL
The mean number of lifetime visits by Zimbabweans to South Africa
was six, with a maximum of 50 visits. Those who had been to South
Africa were then asked how frequently they had visited that country
during the past five years. A little over one third (35%) said that they
visited South Africa once every few months or more frequently. This
high frequency of visiting is not necessarily an indication of intent to
migrate - legally or otherwise - but, as will be shown later, is related to
the purpose of the visits.
Females had made more frequent visits than males over the previous
five years (Table 2.6). Some 45% of the women reported that they visit-
ed South Africa at least once a month and another 34% visited at least
once a year. In contrast, only 10% of the males travelled every month
and another 41% at least once a year. Nearly half of the men (but only
21% of women) had visited only once a year or less in the previous five
years. Thus, involvement in cross-border movement to South Africa has
become a regular way of life for many women.
Further evidence that much of the cross-border movement from
Zimbabwe to South Africa is circulatory in nature is provided by the
fact that the average length of stay per visit was less than two weeks for
45% of all the visitors during the previous five years. Up to 70% stayed
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Table 2.5: Employment Status of Respondents Who Have Visited South Africa
Employment Status Males (%) Females (%)
Employed – formal sector 35 10
Employed – informal sector 7 10
Unemployed – looking for work 31 27*
Unemployed – not looking for work 23 52*
Others e.g. pensioners/students 4 1
N=200
* includes homemakers
Table 2.6: Frequency of Visits to South Africa During the Past Five Years
Frequency Males (%) Females (%)
More than once a month 2 12
Once a month 8 33
Once every few months 10 14
Once or twice a year 31 20
Less than once a year 22 9
Only once 27 12
N=166
for less than one month. Only 6% stayed for more than one year, the
longest reported stay being 5.5 years. In general, women stay for much
shorter periods in South Africa than men (Table 2.7). Almost two
thirds of the females stayed for less than two weeks, compared with only
one third of the males. Almost 90% of the females returned to
Zimbabwe within one month. In contrast, a little over two fifths of the
males stayed for over one month. At the other end of the scale, almost
9% of the males who had been to South Africa said that they had
stayed an average of one year or more during the past five years.
Those respondents who said that they had been to South Africa
were asked how they had got there on their most recent visit. Public
transport was the most frequently used mode of transport by both males
and females, notably buses, trains and “combis” (i.e., 10-15 seater
minibuses) (Table 2.8). However, there seems to be a difference
between males and females in terms of the preferred modes of public
transport. Choice of transport mode for females appeared more restrict-
ed than for males, with two thirds of the women using either buses or
trains. Males on the other hand, used a wider range of transport, includ-
ing on foot (21%), by private car (10%) and by plane (7%).
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Table 2.7: Average Length of Stay in South Africa During Visits in the Past Five Years
Length of Stay Males (%) Females (%)
Up to 2 weeks 33 62
3 to 4 weeks 24 25
1 to 3 months 14 6
3 to 6 months 3 1
6 months to 1 year 17 3
More than 1 year 9 3
N=174
Table 2.8: Mode of Transport Used During the Most Recent Visit to South Africa
Mode Males (%) Females (%)
Bus 37 32
Train 12 35
“Combi” 12 23
On foot 21 5
Private car 10 4
Plane 7 1
Bus/train and on foot 2 0
N=200
Overall, public transport by bus, train and “combi” was used by 72%
of the travellers. Those are the preferred modes of transport by low-
income groups because of the lower fares. Expanding cross-border trans-
port services are regulated by the state in both countries to some extent
through the granting of permits and the requirement for some form of
passenger insurance cover. They also operate from known points within
urban areas, and they pass through official border crossing points. Most
of the respondents would have passed through Beitbridge (Zimbabwe)
and Messina (South Africa), the only official direct crossing point for
overland travellers between the two countries.
From the viewpoint of the immigration and border control authori-
ties, it is those who walked part of or the entire journey from their areas
of origin into South Africa who would be cause for concern (the “on
foot” category in Table 2.8). Most of the respondents in this category
were males. Twenty-one percent of them said they went on foot while
another 2% used either bus or train for part of their journey and then
walked across the border. Five percent of the female respondents said
that they had also walked across the border. The data does not reveal
whether these people used legal crossing points or not when they
crossed the border on foot. During 1996 immigration authorities of the
two countries agreed to open two informal crossing points in addition to
Beitbridge, one west and the other east of the town. The two crossing
points were intended to facilitate the movement of rural people and
farmworkers living in districts along the border. Under the visiting sys-
tem, temporary permits valid for up to 21 days are issued even to non-
passport holders, allowing the permit holder to travel up to 50 kilome-
tres on the other side of the border. Most of the people who use the
informal crossing points are visiting relatives on the other side. Others
are going to work as labourers on commercial farms in South Africa’s
Northern Province under a local system involving the issue of tempo-
rary work permits at the border.47 Sixty-one percent of the respondents
who had walked across the border came from the two districts of
Beitbridge and Chiredzi which are adjacent to the Limpopo River. The
other eleven also came mostly from districts in the south of the country,
notably Chipinge, Gwanda and Zaka, suggesting that at least some of
this pedestrian traffic was authorized.
Monitoring of press and police reports over the past few years sup-
ports the finding in this survey that it is mostly males who cross the bor-
der in this way and that it reaches its peak around December-January.
This is the time when those Zimbabweans staying “illegally” in South
Africa want to come home for Christmas and go back after New Year.48
Tragically, this is also the time when the Limpopo River may be run-
ning high, resulting in some of these “border-jumpers” being drowned or
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attacked by crocodiles, with such incidents being widely reported in the
press.
2.6 WHY DO THEY GO TO SOUTH AFRICA?
Asked about the purpose of their most recent visit to South Africa, the
most frequently cited reason by the majority of the female respondents
(65%) was shopping or to sell and buy goods for importation into
Zimbabwe (Table 2.9). Visiting family or friends was the only other
noteworthy reason for travelling to South Africa, given by 16% of the
female respondents. These two factors alone accounted for 81% of the
responses from females. It has already been noted that the majority of
women stayed in South Africa for up to two weeks only at a time. This
gender difference is in keeping with the primary reason for travel,
namely informal trading. A fortnight provides sufficient time for them
to dispose of whatever wares they have brought with them, and then
purchase those goods they want to take back to Zimbabwe. The results
also confirm a public perception in both countries that it is mostly
women who engage in informal cross-border trading.
In contrast, although informal trading was also the principal reason
given by the male respondents (32%), those who had gone to South
Africa either to look for work or to work were well represented as well
(Table 2.9). Reasons pertaining to work in South Africa were given by
41% of the male respondents, compared with only 4% of the females. A
potential permanent or semi-permanent migration stream, legal or oth-
erwise, would only come from these two work-related categories. All the
other reasons given in Table 2.9 for the most recent visit represent
short-term circulatory transborder movements, primarily for small-scale
informal trading, or for family and other personal reasons.
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Table 2.9: Purpose of Most Recent Visit to South Africa During the Past Five Years
Purpose of Visit Males (%) Females (%)
Shopping/buying and selling goods 32 65
Work 20 3
Look for work 21 1
Visit family/friends 11 16
Business 8 8
Holiday 3 4
Medical treatment 2 1
School/college/university 3 1
N=191
2.7 CONCLUSION
It is clear from the results presented in this study that the typical
Zimbabwean man/woman who has been going to South Africa during
the past few years does not fit the public stereotype that has been por-
trayed in that country. She/he is typically a middle-aged family person
who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of
her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The major-
ity of these people are engaged in purpose-specific circulatory migration
in which they are only spending very short periods of time in South
Africa.
These findings raise the question of what policy alternatives South
Africa should adopt in the future, alternatives that range from a dracon-
ian policy that seeks greater closure of national boundaries (rigidly
enforcing controls and expulsion and running contrary to the SADC
proposal for greater freedom of movement for people within the region),
to a humane option that takes cognisance of the issues raised in this
chapter and seeks to facilitate better living conditions in the home
countries of the migrants. This latter option will not take away South
Africa’s right to deal effectively with undocumented immigrants who
cross national boundaries “illegally” or overstay and break the condi-
tions of their original entry permits regarding employment. The point
has been made elsewhere that “it is important to distinguish between
short-term, purpose-oriented cross-border migration of the sort
described by most respondents in this research, and long-term perma-
nent immigration”, making it possible to regularize those short-term
cross-border migrants who might otherwise be forced to use illegal
means of getting into and/or staying in South Africa.49 It is also impor-
tant to recognize that any new (im)migration policy should be framed
in a manner consistent with South Africa’s current and future role with-
in the region, and include related issues such as the quest for balanced
regional trade and development between SADC member countries, and
regional economic integration.
Finally, this chapter has attempted to contribute towards a better
understanding of the population geography of Zimbabwe by profiling
the persons that have been involved in cross-border movements
between this country and South Africa. More research is clearly needed
in this area. For instance, it has been suggested that the majority of
those who travel to South Africa are going to sell and buy goods for
subsequent resale back home. But we do not as yet know the signifi-
cance of this trade to the economies of the two countries. We do not
know, for example, the benefits, if any, of this trade to South Africa in
terms of export earnings over and above those reported in the standard
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national accounts statistics, or the extent of the benefits to Zimbabwe
in terms of the social support that the affected households get from such
trade which would otherwise be borne by the state. Another issue that
requires further investigation is the extent to which cross-border trade is
contributing towards the economic empowerment of women and reduc-
ing their dependence on the wage incomes of their spouses.
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CHAPTER THREE
ZIMBABWEAN ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS,
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
DAN TEVERA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Previous SAMP surveys have documented the hostile attitudes ofthe South African population towards foreign citizens in thecountry.50 The question which SAMP has recently tried toaddress is whether these attitudes are confined to South Africa
or occur across the region at large. This is an important exercise. The
increasingly globalising economies of Southern Africa are inevitably
becoming more interdependent resulting in increasing flows of people
within the sub-region. Policy-makers and human rights groups need to
know how these movements will be received by citizens, what happens
to their own citizens when they move to other countries in the region,
and what public education strategies are necessary to educate the public
against xenophobia and about the values of freer movement. 
This chapter presents the findings of the SAMP National
Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) conducted in Zimbabwe in mid-
2001. The chapter begins by outlining the research methodology and
proceeds to give an overview of international migration patterns into
Zimbabwe. The results of the survey are then presented and appropriate
policy recommendations made.
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A total of 738 questionnaires were administered in three major urban
centres of Zimbabwe, namely Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru. The bulk of
these interviews (449) were conducted in Harare, the capital city. Two
hundred and thirty nine questionnaires were administered in Bulawayo
and 50 in Gweru. The total number of respondents in each city was
decided on the basis of the populations of the cities based on the results
of the Zimbabwe1992 census.
To determine the number of questionnaire interviews that would be
conducted in each of the cities as well as the actual selection procedure
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of respondents within the cities, each town was initially divided accord-
ing to its residential density. These residential areas served as primary
sampling units (PSUs) from which the surveyed suburbs were randomly
selected. Stratified random sampling was used to select the suburbs
which were surveyed. Once the suburbs were identified, systematic sam-
pling was used to select the households where every 5th house was
interviewed. About 60% of the respondents in Harare were drawn from
the high-density residential suburbs of Mbare and Glen View. The other
residential suburbs from which the respondents were drawn included
Sunningdale, Vainona/Borrowdale, Mount Pleasant and the Avenues.
The same sampling procedure was used in Bulawayo where the follow-
ing suburbs were selected for the interviews: North End, Queens Park
East and West, Pelandaba, Makokoba and Mzilikazi. In Gweru the
respondents were drawn from Mkoba and Riverside. One person was
interviewed in each target household and the respondents were alter-
nated on the basis of age and gender.
A two-day workshop was held for the training of undergraduate stu-
dent interviewers at the University of Zimbabwe. The interviewers were
organised into three groups and were assigned to different suburbs in the
three cities. However, the interviewers experienced problems particular-
ly in the high-income areas where the residents were reluctant to be
interviewed and quite often were unwilling to open their electric gates.
There were also problems in interviewing members of the white com-
munity who were reluctant to respond to the questionnaire at a time
when the political climate was so charged.
3.3 PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE
In order to determine whether Zimbabwean attitudes vary by race, gen-
der, age, socio-economic status or travel experience, it is first necessary
to provide a profile of the sample population.
RACIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
Four major racial groups were included in the sample, namely,
Blacks/Africans; Whites/Europeans; Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
Table 3.1 shows the population distribution of Zimbabwe by ethnicity
according to the results of the 1992 census.51 The majority of the coun-
try’s population (98.8%) is black. Europeans comprise the second largest
group (0.8%) followed by those of mixed colour (0.3%) and Asiatic ori-
gin (0.1%). This distribution was taken into consideration in sample
selection.
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The majority of the survey respondents (94.1%) were black, 3.8%
were coloured, 1.9% were white, while 0.1% belonged to other races
(Table 3.2). There is also a good gender balance in the distribution of
the respondents, with 53.6% of the respondents being male, and 46.4%
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Table 3.1: Population by Ethnicity (Zimbabwe Census 1992)
Ethnic Group Total Number Percentage
African 10,284,345 98.77
European 82,797 0.80
Asiatic 13,386 0.13
Mixed 30,063 0.29
NS 1,957 0.02
Total 10,412,548 100.00
Source: Central Statistical Office 
Table 3.2: Demographic Profile of the Respondents
Race Percentage
White 1.9
Black 94.1
Coloured 3.8
Other 0.1
N=735
Sex Percentage
Male 53.6
Female 46.4
N=715
Age Percentage
16-24 36.8
25-34 27.7
35-49 23.0
Above 50 12.5
N=736
Highest educational level Percentage
None 2.3
Grades 1-7 10.4
Forms 1-6 68.4
Post-Graduate/Diplomas 18.9
N=734
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 in this and subsequent tables due to rounding.
female. The sampling procedure produced a youthful sample, with
36.8% of the respondents aged below 25 years and 27.7% of the respon-
dents aged between 25 and 34. Twenty-three percent of the respondents
were between 35 and 49, while only 12.5% of the respondents were
over 50 years. About 88% of the respondents were therefore aged
between 16 and 50, which represents the working population. Only
2.3% of the respondents reported not having received any formal educa-
tion, while 10.4% had not managed to go beyond primary school. As
many as 68.4% of the respondents had received secondary school educa-
tion, while 18.9% had diplomas and degree qualifications. This probably
reflects the great strides that Zimbabwe has made in making education
available to most of its citizens.
The household incomes of the respondents varied, with 28.4% earn-
ing less than Z$5,000 which is way below the poverty datum line (Table
3.3). Another, 22.2% earn between Z$5,001 and Z$10,000 which is also
below the poverty datum line for a family of four. A notable proportion
(21.6%) of the sample earn between Z$10,001 and Z$20,000 while
27.8% earn more than Z$20,000 per month. This reflects the skewed
income distribution in the country’s urban centres where only a few
individuals have higher earnings and the majority are poor.
About 38% of the respondents have formal jobs and 18.5% engage
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 25
45
Table 3.3: Economic Profile 
Income Percentage
Less than Z$5,000 28.4
Z$5,001-Z$10,000 22.2
Z$10,001-Z$20,000 21.6
Above Z$20,000 27.8
N=676
Work Status Percentage
Formal employment 38.3
Informal employment 18.5
Unemployed – looking for work 15.5
Unemployed – not looking for work 27.7
N=736
Class Percentage
Poor 46.8
Working class 18.8
Middle class 29.0
Upper middle class 5.3
N=713
in informal sector activities. Furthermore, 43.2% of the respondents
were unemployed (with 27.7% looking for work). The relatively low
level of formal employment could be attributed to the effects of the
country’s economic crisis. This has increased the number of people
engaged in the informal sector as a way of cushioning themselves
against the negative effects of economic shrinkage. 
A considerable proportion of the respondents viewed themselves as
being poor (46.8%), while another 18.8% simply described themselves
as being in the working class. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents
viewed themselves as middle class while only 5.3% considered them-
selves upper middle class.
The dominant language among the respondents was Shona, spoken
by 67.4% of the respondents at home, whilst 22.2% of the respondents
spoke Ndebele (Table 3.4). Ndebele is mostly spoken in the southern
and western parts of the country while Shona is spoken by the majority
of the country’s population. 
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Table 3.4: Linguistic Composition and Religious Affiliation
Language Percentage
Shona 67.4
Ndebele 22.2
English 8.4
Kalanga 0.6
Tonga/Shangaan 0.4
Venda 0.3
Afrikaans 0.1
Zulu 0.1
Xhosa 0.1
Tswana 0.1
Other 0.1
N=725
Primary religious affiliation Percentage
Christian 70.1
Christian Independent 14.1
Traditional 11.0
Atheist 2.1
Other 1.9
Muslim 0.1
Hindu 0.1
N=730
PREVIOUS MIGRATION EXPERIENCE
It is generally assumed that people who have travelled and lived outside
their home country are more likely to be accommodating towards for-
eigners than those who have not. About 56% of the respondents had
never travelled outside Zimbabwe, 28.2% had done so, while 16% had
lived outside Zimbabwe at some point in their life.
Table 3.5 shows that South Africa (20%) was the most popular desti-
nation followed by Botswana (14.6%), Zambia (8.5%) and Europe and
America (5%). Geographical proximity explains this pattern as very few
people can afford to travel to destinations outside the region. The most
popular destinations are the countries that Zimbabweans generally have
strong trade ties with.
Only 18.9% of the respondents had lived outside Zimbabwe for more
than six months (Table 3.6). The most popular countries included
South Africa (6.7%), Botswana (2.8%), Zambia (2.4%) and Europe and
North America (4%). The majority had been to these countries as
migrant workers or refugees.
ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS
Information was sought from respondents regarding their perceptions of
present economic conditions in Zimbabwe and their opinions about the
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Table 3.5: Places Travelled to Outside Own Country
Country Frequency Percent
South Africa 220 20.0
Botswana 160 14.6
Zambia 93 8.5
Mozambique 60 5.5
Europe and North America 58 5.3
Malawi 36 3.3
Namibia 15 1.4
Africa (outside Southern Africa) 12 1.1
Angola 10 0.9
Swaziland 10 0.9
Lesotho 7 0.6
Asia, India and China 7 0.6
Never travelled outside home country 411 37.7
Total 1,099 100.0
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.
future. This is because low-income groups are often perceived as being
more xenophobic and hostile towards migrants since they view them as
competitors in the job market.
The majority of the respondents were clearly not satisfied with their
personal economic conditions; 82.4% being dissatisfied or very dissatis-
fied (Table 3.7). These sentiments are probably a reflection of the present
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Table 3.6: Places Lived in Outside Own Country for More than 6 Months
Country Frequency Percent
South Africa 50 6.7
Namibia 2 0.3
Botswana 21 2.8
Mozambique 7 0.9
Malawi 5 0.7
Zambia 18 2.4
Swaziland 3 0.4
Lesotho 1 0.1
Africa (outside Southern Africa) 2 0.3
Europe and North America 30 4.0
Asia, India and China 2 0.3
Never 606 81.1
Total 747 100.0
Total is total response since question is multiple choice.
Table 3.7: Opinion About Personal Economic Condition
Opinion about present personal economic condition Percentage
Very satisfied 1.4
Satisfied 9.5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 6.8
Dissatisfied 35.0
Very dissatisfied 47.4
N=737
Opinion about personal economic condition in one year’s time Percentage
Much better 3.5
Better 17.2
Same 10.8
Worse 28.8
Much worse 39.7
N=715
economic situation in the country which is characterised by high infla-
tion (in excess of 50%), the high cost of living and low remuneration
given to workers.
The respondents were pessimistic about their future personal eco-
nomic conditions. Nearly 70 percent of the respondents anticipate that
these would be worse or much worse in a year’s time. Most of the
respondents therefore do not foresee an immediate end to the current
economic crisis in the country. 
Table 3.8 shows that there is widespread dissatisfaction with current
economic conditions in the country, with 92% being dissatisfied or very
dissatisfied (Table 3.8). The respondents were also gloomy about future
general economic conditions. Nearly 80% of respondents expect eco-
nomic conditions to be worse or much worse in a year. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY
Race, class, language and religion are important variables in defining
the identity of socio-economic and cultural groups. They may also
impact on the treatment of outsiders. Hence, respondents were asked to
indicate the importance of these four variables to the way they view
themselves. Over 60 percent see race, language and religion as being
important or very important to the way they see themselves (Table 3.9),
with religion the strongest marker of identity (73.5% important/very
important). 
The vast majority of respondents also considered being
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Table 3.8: Satisfaction with Economic Conditions in Zimbabwe
Satisfaction with present economic conditions in Zimbabwe Percentage
Very satisfied 0.8
Satisfied 2.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4.5
Dissatisfied 33.8
Very dissatisfied 58.2
N=734
Expectation of economic conditions in Zimbabwe (in one year) Percentage
Much better 1.8
Better 10.1
Same 9.9
Worse 28.3
Much worse 49.9
N=720
“Zimbabwean” as an important part of their personal identity. Table
3.10 shows that 70% of the respondents strongly felt that their nation-
ality constituted an important part of the way they viewed themselves,
with only 13% finding it unimportant. Similar numbers wanted their
children to think of themselves as Zimbabwean. These results show that
there is still a strong sense of Zimbabwean identity.
Only 39.1% of the respondents considered being black as essential or
important in the definition of Zimbabwean identity (Table 3.11).
Similar proportions saw speaking an African language and loyalty to
Africa as important determinants of Zimbabwean identity. Many more
(66.6%) considered it essential or important to have been born in
Zimbabwe in order for someone to be considered Zimbabwean. There
was also a consensus that it is essential or important to have one’s par-
ents and grandparents born in Zimbabwe (60.6% and 56.1%). 
The respondents were also asked about dual citizenship. The consti-
tution of Zimbabwe does not allow dual citizenship but the survey
showed that 53.8% of the respondents do not regard it important/essen-
tial that Zimbabweans renounce other citizenship claims. 
The respondents were then asked whether support of the
Zimbabwean constitution is essential. The majority of the respondents
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Table 3.9: Importance of Race, Class, Language and Religion in How the Respondents View
Themselves
Race Class Language Religion
Very important 38.0 16.9 38.8 49.7
Important 23.5 24.4 29.8 23.8
Neutral 16.2 22.6 14.2 11.1
Not important 17.7 27.2 13.9 11.0
Very unimportant 4.6 8.9 3.3 4.3
N=722 N=717 N=725 N=718
Table 3.10: Personal and Ethnic Identity
Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly 
agree nor disagree disagree
Being Zimbabwean is an important 46.3 34.1 6.8 10.1 2.7
part of how you see yourself
You want your children to think of 46.9 34.6 7.7 9.2 1.6
themselves as Zimbabwean
It makes you proud to be a 48.6 26.4 8.6 11.3 5.1
Zimbabwean
(61.9%) saw this an essential or important part of being a Zimbabwean.
Noteworthy, though, were the remaining 38.1% who do not believe
that it is important for true Zimbabweans to support the constitution.
The respondents demonstrated a strong feeling of belonging to the
Zimbabwean nation. They are proud to be Zimbabwean (78.8%
agree/strongly agree) and view their nationality as an important part of
their identity (81.7% agree/strongly agree). They would also want their
children to see themselves as Zimbabweans (83.8% agree/strongly agree)
and feel strong ties with people who call themselves Zimbabwean
(77.1% agree/strongly agree). The respondents have a strong desire to
create a unified Zimbabwean state (81.9% agree/strongly agree) and
believe it is possible to create such a state (71.6% agree/strongly agree).
An overwhelming majority of the respondents (92.5%) are of the opin-
ion that all people in the country should work together towards nation-
al development (Table 3.12).
Most of the respondents said they enjoy interacting with different
people (90% agree/strongly agree) (Table 3.13). They also indicated
that they do not dislike meeting new people (84.3% disagree/strongly
disagree) and they believe that exposure to different cultures enriches
one’s life (72.1% agree/strongly agree). While the majority would not
easily trust a person from a different culture they could generally accept
these people into their societies (69.6% agree/strongly agree). 
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Table 3.11: Importance of Various Attributes in Defining a ‘True’ Zimbabwean
Essential Important Not very Not at all
important important
Being black 19.2 19.9 30.3 30.7
Speaking an African language 14.6 26.4 34.9 24.1
Owing your ultimate loyalty to Africa 24.8 37.2 21.6 16.4
Being born in Zimbabwe 32.9 33.7 20.5 12.9
Having parents who were born in Zimbabwe 28.0 32.6 23.9 15.5
Having grandparents who were born in 29.9 26.2 26.5 17.5
Zimbabwe
Speaking a Zimbabwean language 27.3 31.1 25.1 16.6
Being willing to fight in a war for Zimbabwe 24.4 25.1 20.2 30.3
Supporting non-racialism 33.3 34.6 16.8 15.4
Being willing to give up citizenship in any 20.8 25.4 25.9 27.9
other country
Supporting the Zimbabwean Constitution 31.1 30.8 18.0 20.1
Working and contributing to the Zimbabwean 52.3 30.2 7.1 10.5
economy
3.4 INTERACTION WITH MIGRANTS
WHY MIGRANTS COME TO ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwean perceptions of why migrants come to Zimbabwe include
both push factors in country of origin and pull factors in Zimbabwe
(Table 3.14). Most migrants are seen as visiting Zimbabwe on holiday or
social reasons (23%), to escape political conditions in their countries
(10.6%) and because economic conditions are perceived to be better in
Zimbabwe (10.3%) and/or worse at home (7.3%). Other significant
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Table 3.12: Perceptions of Respondents Regarding National Unity
Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree
disagree
It makes you proud to be a 49.0 29.8 9.6 7.1 4.5
Zimbabwean
Being a Zimbabwean is an important 48.2 33.5 7.9 7.4 3.0
part of how you see yourself
You would want your children to 50.4 33.4 8.4 5.8 2.1
see themselves as Zimbabweans
Do you feel strong ties with people 36.2 40.9 11.9 8.2 2.8
who call themselves Zimbabweans?
It is desirable to create one unified 43.5 38.4 8.2 7.6 1.3
Zimbabwean nation
It is possible to create such a 35.4 36.2 12.0 12.1 4.3
unified Zimbabwean nation
People should realise that we are 59.3 33.2 3.6 2.3 1.6
all Zimbabweans
Table 3.13: Views about Society, Life and Identity
Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree
disagree
You enjoy interacting with people 42.8 47.2 3.3 5.5 1.2
who are different from you
You dislike meeting new people 4.9 7.3 5.4 53.6 28.7
Exposure to different cultures 30.0 42.1 11.4 10.6 6.0
enriches one’s life
It is easy to trust a person from a 10.0 18.0 18.0 33.7 20.5
different culture
You can usually accept people from 21.1 48.5 11.9 10.9 7.6
other cultures
responses included a better quality of life in Zimbabwe (9.3%) and
hunger/famine in the migrant’s home country (8.2%). 
ACCEPTANCE OF MIGRANTS
Migrants have generally been welcomed into Zimbabwe in the past but
their foreign identity is emphasized by the various names coined to
describe them. For example, Malawians are called mabhurandaya (a term
meaning those from Blantyre, once the capital city of Malawi),
MaNyasaland (a term derived from Nyasaland, the former name of
Malawi) and Mabwidi (a derogatory term). Mozambicans are commonly
referred to as Moskens - a corruption of the term Mozambicans. 
Does the nationality of migrants affect the degree of acceptance?
The research findings show that migrants from the rest of Africa are
slightly more acceptable to Zimbabweans than those from other conti-
nents (Table 3.15). Migrants from Southern Africa enjoy marginally
greater acceptance than those from other parts of Africa.
CONTACT WITH MIGRANTS AND VISITORS
The research findings reveal that urban Zimbabweans have frequent con-
tact with foreign citizens. Table 3.16 shows that they have the greatest
level of contact with people from South Africa (with 77.2% reporting
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Table 3.14: Perceived Reasons Why People from Other Countries Come to Zimbabwe
Frequency Percent
Visit, holiday, meet people 531 23.0
Political conditions in foreigner’s home country 246 10.6
Better economy here 239 10.3
Better health care etc. and quality of life here 215 9.3
Hunger/famine in foreigner’s home country 189 8.2
Better environment/population conditions here 172 7.4
Worse/bad economy in foreigner’s home country 168 7.3
Worse/bad environment in foreigner’s home country 151 6.5
To develop our country 128 5.5
Move here permanently/to immigrate 116 5.0
Political conditions here 79 3.4
To commit crimes/cause trouble 71 3.1
Other 5 0.2
Total 2,310 100.0
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice
some or a great deal of contact). Contact with non-citizens from the
rest of Africa and from outside Africa was much lower but by no means
insignificant.
The research showed that the nature of contact with foreigners
varies (Table 3.17). Economic contact was most significant, primarily
buying and selling goods, probably in connection with the tourism and
retail industries. Economic interaction is also important in the work-
place. Social interaction, particularly friendship, is also relatively signifi-
cant. Unlike South Africans, therefore, Zimbabweans have much more
personal interaction with foreigners in the country.
On the whole, the respondents view their interactions with foreign-
ers positively. Table 3.18 shows that as many as 73% of the respondents
found their interactions with foreigners from Europe and North
America to be positive/very positive. The equivalent figure was 80.6%
for foreigners from other countries in Southern Africa; 72.4% for for-
eigners from other parts of Africa; 67% for foreigners from Asia and
82.9% for foreigners from South Africa. Generally, therefore, respon-
dents felt that they had benefited more from their interactions with for-
eigners from Africa than those from elsewhere.
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Table 3.15: Acceptability of Non-citizens in Zimbabwe
Yes No
No. % No. %
Europe and North America 414 58.1 299 41.9
Other countries in southern Africa 486 68.2 227 31.8
Other parts of Africa 460 64.3 255 35.7
Asia 395 55.5 317 44.5
Table 3.16: Level of Contact with Non-citizens
Great deal Some Hardly at all None
No. % No. % No. % No. #
People from other countries in North America 101 14.0 261 36.1 89 12.3 272 37.6
and Europe
People from southern African countries 122 17.0 326 45.3 61 8.5 210 29.2
People from other countries in Africa 96 13.4 303 42.1 79 11.0 241 33.5
People from Asia 77 10.7 216 30.1 107 14.9 318 44.3
People from South Africa 206 28.4 354 48.8 42 5.8 124 17.1
3.5 STEREOTYPES OF MIGRANTS
PERCEIVED NUMBERS
The respondents consistently overestimated the numbers of foreign
nationals in the country. For example, they estimated the median pro-
portion to be 25% of the total population (Table 3.19). Younger
Zimbabweans tended to overestimate to a greater extent than their eld-
ers. There were also significant variations in the estimates by level of
income. Respondents who earned low incomes estimated the population
of foreigners to be higher. However, the differences were not large with
all age and income groups tending to exaggerate the numbers.
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 25
55
Table 3.17: Type of Personal Contact with Migrants (%)
North Southern Other parts Asia South
America/ Africa of Africa Africa
Europe
Work for/ with them 23.4 16.2 16.8 16.4 13.1
Live next to them 11.3 17.0 12.4 7.9 16.8
Are friends with them 23.9 26.0 24.8 15.0 26.1
Children go to school with them 10.7 9.3 9.9 9.2 7.1
Buy things from, or sell things 28.2 30.2 34.8 51.1 34.0
to them
Other 1.5 0.6 1.3 — 0.5
Relatives/ Family 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.4 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=786 N=906 N=710 N=532 N=1,150
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice
Table 3.18: Interactions with Migrants (%)
North Southern Other parts Asia South 
America/ Africa of Africa Africa
Europe
Very positive 18.6 14.8 12.9 11.5 24.5
Positive 54.4 65.8 59.5 55.5 58.4
Neither positive nor negative 15.0 13.9 20.5 19.5 11.1
Negative 7.7 4.2 5.3 8.9 4.7
Very negative 4.1 1.3 1.8 4.6 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=413 N=474 N=435 N=348 N=575
The respondents believe, quite correctly, that most migrants living
in the country are from Southern African countries. They also estimat-
ed on average that 30% had entered the country illegally. Here the esti-
mates varied significantly with a number of parameters. Firstly, those
with less education believed the numbers to be higher. Second, there
was a significant gender difference. Males estimated that undocumented
migrants constitute 34.4% of all migrants in the country, while females
estimated the proportion to be 40.8%. Third, the estimates varied
slightly by the level of income of the respondents. Respondents who
earned below ZW$5,000 believed the proportion to be 37% as opposed
to 34% for those earning more than ZW$20,001. Fourth, the estimate of
the proportion of undocumented migrants in the country varied with the
travel history of the respondents. Respondents who have never travelled
out of the country thought the proportion was slightly higher than those
who had (39% v 35%).
The respondents believe that 40% are in the country temporarily,
30% intend to remain permanently and 20% are refugees. Those with
no formal education believed that as many as 47% intended to remain
permanently while respondents with post-graduate degree/diplomas esti-
mated the proportion at 35%. Furthermore, respondents in formal
employment estimated the proportion at 40.4%, while the unemployed
estimated it at 43.5%. 
The estimates of the proportion of refugees amongst all foreign
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Table 3.19: Perceptions of Types of Migrants
Frequency Mean Median
Share of people living in this country who are:
Nationals 645 73.2 75.0
Foreign 645 26.8 25.0
Share of foreign nationals coming from:
Southern Africa 581 49.9 50.0
The rest of Africa 581 18.1 15.0
Europe/North America 581 18.1 15.0
Asia/Pacific 581 14.0 10.0
Proportion of foreign nationals who are:
Here legally 603 62.7 70.0
Here illegally 603 37.3 30.0
Share:
Who intend to remain permanently 537 34.4 30.0
Who intend to remain temporarily 537 42.7 40.0
Who are refugees 537 22.9 20.0
nationals in the country also varied by income and level of education.
Poor respondents estimated the proportion of refugees to be 24.5%,
while respondents in the upper middle/upper class estimated this pro-
portion at 17.2%. 
Nearly half of the respondents believed that less than 20% of the
foreigners in the country are genuine refugees (Table 3.20).
Zimbabweans therefore feel that the majority of refugees resident in the
country are, in fact, economic migrants. This finding is crucial as it
helps in predicting the treatment of refugees by the local population. 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Migrants have been accused of stealing jobs from local people. The
respondents were therefore asked whether they had heard of anyone
being denied a job in favour of a foreign migrant. A sizable 69% had no
personal knowledge of any Zimbabwean being denied a job that went to
a foreign national (Table 3.21). An even higher 79% did not personally
know anyone who had been denied a job and more than 90% said they
themselves had never been denied a job because it went to a foreigner. 
COMMON STEREOTYPES
The respondents were asked to consider a list of impacts which are
sometimes associated with foreign migrants. They ranked these impacts
on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 meant none of them do this
while 10 meant all of them do this (Table 3.22). The majority of the
respondents believed that migrants from the region send earnings out of
Zimbabwe (mean 6.7). They also thought that migrants bring diseases
to Zimbabwe (6.3) and that they use Zimbabwean welfare services (5.9).
They were also accused of committing crimes in Zimbabwe (5.6) and
taking jobs from Zimbabweans (5.4), contradicting their limited knowl-
edge of this ever happening. (Most of these respondents were unem-
ployed (5.9), have not received any form of formal education (7.2) and
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Table 3.20: Proportion who are Genuine Refugees
Percentage of refugees Frequency Percentage of Respondents
10-20 305 47.4
30-40 127 19.7
50-60 87 13.5
70-80 82 12.7
90-100 43 6.7
Total 644 100.0
their incomes are below ZW$5 000 (5.7).) However, the respondents
also commented positively on the contributions of foreign migrants to
the economy, including bringing in needed skills (5.8) and creating jobs
in Zimbabwe (5.4).
ACTION AGAINST MIGRANTS
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would take action if
they become aware of the presence of someone illegally in the country.
Sixty two percent indicated that they would do nothing while 26.8%
indicated that they would report them to the police, 4.9% to the local
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Table 3.21: Competition on the Job Market
Frequency Percent
Ever heard of anyone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?
More than once 127 18.6
Once 83 12.2
Never 472 69.2
Total 682 100.0
Personally know someone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?
More than once 68 10.2
Once 73 10.9
Never 528 78.9
Total 669 100.0
Been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?
More than once 33 4.7
Once 33 4.7
Never 634 90.6
Total 700 100.0
Table 3.22: Southern Africans Who Are Presently Living in Zimbabwe
Frequency Mean
Take jobs from Zimbabweans 733 5.4
Commit crimes in Zimbabwe 731 5.6
Send earnings out of Zimbabwe 732 6.7
Use Zimbabwe’s welfare services 727 5.9
Bring diseases to Zimbabwe 728 6.3
Create jobs for Zimbabweans 733 5.4
Bring skills needed by Zimbabwe 734 5.8
Scale: “0” means none of them do this and “10” means all of them do this.
community association and 2.2% to their employers (Table 3.23). Only
1.7% of the respondents said they would get people together to force
them to leave while 1.4% of the respondents said they would use vio-
lence to do so. These figures suggest quite high levels of tolerance of
foreign migrants, even those illegally in the country.
This was confirmed by responses to a related series of questions.
Firstly, as many as 73.6% of the respondents indicated that it was
unlikely/very unlikely that they would take any action to prevent other
Southern Africans moving to their neighbourhood (Table 3.24).
Furthermore, 77% had no objection to them operating a business in
their area and 77.3% indicated that they would not take any action to
prevent them from becoming co-workers. 
3.6 IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES
TYPES OF IMMIGRANTS
The research findings show that most Zimbabweans do favour a tightly
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Table 3.23: Probable Actions Against Undocumented Migrants
Frequency Mean
Nothing 479 62.0
Report them to the police 207 26.8
Report them to community association 38 4.9
Report them to employer 17 2.2
Get people together to force them to leave 13 1.7
Use violence 11 1.4
Other 5 0.6
Talk and advise 3 0.4
Total 773 100.0
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.
Table 3.24: Likelihood of Taking Action in Response to Various Actions by Other Southern
African Nationals (%)
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely
Moving into your neighbourhood 7.4 19.1 43.3 30.3
Operating a business in your area 7.4 15.6 41.7 35.3
Sitting in the same classroom as your children 6.4 13.7 40.2 39.7
Becoming one of your co-workers 6.4 16.4 40.0 37.3
controlled immigration policy (Table 3.25). As many as 68.9% said the
government should place strict limits on the number of foreign citizens
who can enter Zimbabwe. When probed further, they revealed a prefer-
ence for people with scarce skills and those who could create jobs. Only
12.3% were in favour of an open door policy allowing anyone into the
country. On the other hand, only 4.2% wanted the government to pro-
hibit people from entering Zimbabwe altogether (compared to 25% in
South Africa).
The majority would prefer it if migrants came temporarily and then
returned home (65.9% support/strongly support) although support for
permanent settlement was not insignificant (Table 3.26). Opposition to
permanent residency varied with the level of education of the respon-
dents, with the more educated respondents supporting the policy.
Likewise, the poor, the unemployed and those who have never travelled
outside the country expressed strong opposition to the granting of per-
manent residence to foreigner nationals.
Most Zimbabweans also clearly favour an immigration policy tied to
the creation of economic value. An overwhelming majority (94.6%)
would support a policy which encouraged immigration of people who
would invest and create jobs. Again, nearly 90% would support a skills-
based policy where immigrants who had skills not possessed by locals
should be given preference.
The respondents were also asked to indicate their views about for-
eign migrants living legally in the country. Fifty-seven percent of the
respondents said they would support or strongly support a policy making
it easier for families of contract workers to come and live in Zimbabwe
(Table 3.26). The majority of these respondents had post-
graduate/diplomas, were upper middle/upper class and had lived outside
the country. However, there was no general consensus among the
respondents on whether contract workers should qualify for permanent
residence after completing their contracts with 43.5% in favour and
44.4% opposed. Respondents in favour had high levels of education,
high incomes and were employed. 
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Table 3.25: Attitude Towards Immigration Policy
Government should: Frequency Mean
Let anyone into the country who wants to enter 86 12.3
Let people into the country as long as they are jobs 102 14.6
Strictly limit the number of foreigners who can enter Zimbabwe 480 68.9
Prohibit people from entering Zimbabwe 29 4.2
Total 697 100.0
The respondents would also support/strongly support a policy to
make it easier for traders and hawkers from other Southern African
countries to sell and buy things in the country (80.6%). The poor and
females were particularly supportive of such an initiative. Nearly 79% of
the respondents would support a policy making it easier for people from
other Southern African countries to start small businesses in the coun-
try. 
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Table 3.26: Attitudes Towards the Treatment of People Working Legally (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Making it easier for families of 12.3 44.8 11.6 18.5 12.8
contract workers to come and live 
in Zimbabwe
Making it easier for contract workers 7.7 35.8 12.1 23.8 20.6
to qualify for permanent residency 
after the completion of their contracts
Making it easier for people from 31.0 49.6 9.9 6.3 3.2
Southern African countries to sell 
and buy things in this country i.e.
hawkers and traders
Making it easier for people from 38.9 39.6 10.0 8.0 3.4
Southern African countries to start 
small businesses in this country
Table 3.27: Attitudes Towards Potential Immigration of Migrants (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Who want to come here legally to 13.5 37.0 12.5 23.3 13.6
work as permanent residents, and 
possibly become citizens
Who want to come legally to work 20.8 45.1 13.0 13.8 7.3
for a specific period and then return 
home
From North America and Europe 14.6 33.8 22.3 18.0 11.4
From Southern African countries 12.4 41.9 26.6 13.1 6.0
From other African countries 13.4 40.9 26.3 13.7 5.6
With skills not possessed by 58.4 30.6 7.0 2.5 1.5
Zimbabweans
Who will invest money in the 73.7 20.9 3.2 0.8 1.5
Zimbabwean economy and create 
jobs
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION
While Zimbabweans therefore have a very positive outlook on legal
immigration, they still want government to control unauthorized entry
(Table 3.28). A considerable proportion of the respondents (48.1%)
said they would support/strongly support border electrification to con-
trol the flow of unauthorized migrants. Most who supported that policy
were young (16-24 years) with low incomes (ZW$1,000-5,000). About
43% of the respondents said they would oppose/strongly oppose such a
move.
About half of the respondents (51.2%) would oppose a policy of
allocating more money from the national budget to border protection.
Most of these earn low incomes. While 62.6% thought the army should
be used to patrol the borders, a massive 77.6% rejected any increase in
their tax levels to cover the expenses of increased border patrols. Again,
opposition was greatest amongst the poor and those earning low
incomes.
Again indicative of the hostile climate, 67.8% of the respondents
would support a policy requiring foreigners to carry identification docu-
ments with them at all times and 74.3% wanted the police to have the
right to detain suspected “illegal immigrants”. Not surprisingly, 59% of
the respondents supported the imposition of penalties on businesses or
persons who employ “illegal immigrants”. Whites were less supportive of
such a policy. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that most
Zimbabweans do not welcome undocumented migrants and would like
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Table 3.28: Attitudes Towards Immigration Control Measures (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Turning on the electric fence at the 23.5 24.6 9.2 21.8 20.9
border
Allocating more money from the 12.7 27.7 8.4 29.1 22.1
national budget to border protection
Using the army to patrol Zimbabwe’s 21.6 41.0 8.7 15.0 13.8
borders
Increasing taxes to cover the 5.1 9.6 7.6 28.2 49.4
expense of increased patrols
Requiring foreigners to carry 25.6 42.2 16.5 9.0 6.8
identification with them at all times
Giving police the right to detain 34.0 44.3 10.1 6.6 5.0
suspected “illegal immigrants”
Penalising businesses or persons 29.6 29.4 16.6 14.5 9.9
who employ “illegal immigrants”
the government to adopt strict measures to limit the inflow into the
country. However, they do not favour measures which draw state
resources from elsewhere.
The majority of the respondents (79%) indicated that they would
oppose a blanket deportation policy (Table 3.29). However, 46.4%
would support the deportation of foreigners who do not contribute to
the economy compared to 41.8% who would oppose such a move.
Support of the policy came from those who have never left the country,
who earn low salaries, have received little or no formal education and
are in the 16-24 age group. The vast majority (90.1%) would support a
policy of deportation of all foreigner nationals who have committed
crimes. Additionally, 78.4% of the respondents would support the
deportation of all undocumented migrants from the country. Poor and
unemployed respondents were most strongly in favour of deportation.
Given this, it is perhaps surprising that 43.4% would support the gov-
ernment offering amnesty to people in the country illegally.
THE BRAIN DRAIN
Two pertinent issues that were also raised in the research related to the
emigration of skilled personnel from the country and the problem of
people taking resources out of the country. The respondents had indi-
cated that they would support the government if it were to allow in
people who had capital to invest in the country. A follow-up question
related to the repatriation of profits and other resources. About half of
the respondents (49.8%) opposed the imposition of measures which
would make it more difficult to send money out of the country compared
to 42.2% who supported such a move (Table 3.30). Neither did they
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Table 3.29: Attitudes Towards Deportation Policy (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Deporting all foreign workers even if 6.0 8.1 7.0 44.0 35.0
they are here legally
Deporting all who do not contribute 21.7 24.7 11.9 26.9 14.9
to the economy
Deporting all who have committed 68.3 21.8 2.9 3.4 3.7
crimes
Deporting all who live here without 54.6 23.8 9.8 8.3 3.4
permission
Offering amnesty to people who are 16.6 26.8 21.9 18.4 16.3
here illegally
want to see the imposition of measures which would make it more diffi-
cult for skilled workers to leave the country (58.4% oppose/strongly
oppose). The government has recently proposed that community service
be mandatory for those who want to register at tertiary institutions of
learning. About half of the respondents opposed the policy. Almost
80% of the respondents supported the use of tax incentives to encour-
age people to stay. 
3.7 REFUGEE POLICY ATTITUDES
A series of questions were asked about government refugee policy.
There was a general consensus that people who are being persecuted in
their countries deserve protection (79.8% support/strongly support).
However, there was also general agreement (62.1%) that it is impossible
to determine whether someone is a refugee or not. 
Zimbabweans are accommodating towards refugees and would sup-
port giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution in their home
countries (Table 3.31). They expressed reservations about increasing the
number of refugees who enter Zimbabwe (85.5% oppose/strongly
oppose) and rejected granting permanent residence to refugees who have
been in the country for more than 5 years (72.6% oppose/strongly
oppose). The majority would like to see refugees sent back to their home
countries (90% support/strongly support) when the situation in their
home country stabilises. They would also prefer that refugees stay in spe-
cial camps (67.1% support/strongly support) but were not supportive of
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Table 3.30: Attitudes Towards the Brain Drain (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Make it more difficult to send money 16.0 26.2 8.1 33.5 16.3
out of the country
Limit the amount of capital one can 20.3 28.9 9.5 26.9 14.9
send out of Zimbabwe
Make it more difficult for skilled 11.8 22.4 7.4 36.4 22.0
people to leave
Make community service mandatory 13.3 25.6 10.6 29.7 20.9
for completion of degrees
Make community service mandatory 16.4 34.1 10.8 21.1 17.7
for state bursaries
Offer tax incentives to those who 44.6 33.3 10.1 6.5 5.4
remain
the government using money from the Zimbabwean budget to shelter
refugees (55.5% oppose/strongly oppose).
3.8 RIGHTS FOR MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
The respondents were asked a series of questions on rights for foreign
nationals while in Zimbabwe. Firstly, they were asked to indicate who
should have the right to say what they wanted (for instance criticising
the government). Most felt that this right should always be granted to
citizens of the country (80.9%), but not to temporary workers/visitors
(50.3%), refugees (64.5%) and “illegal immigrants” (82.9%) (Table
3.32). The responses certainly indicate that Zimbabweans feel that out-
siders should not interfere in the day to day running of the government
and the internal affairs of the country, which they consider as the sole
privilege of the citizens of the country. Secondly, the majority (97.3%)
felt that the right to vote in Zimbabwean elections should only be given
to the country’s citizens. Thirdly, they felt that the right to legal protec-
tion, such as not being detained without a trial, or having a lawyer
when one goes to court should always be provided to Zimbabwean citi-
zens (93.4%) as well as temporary workers/visitors (56.3%) and refugees
(48.9%). Fourthly, the right to be protected by the police, to be free
from illegal searches and having one’s property protected should always
be given to Zimbabwean citizens (95.5%) as well as temporary work-
ers/visitors (66.7%) and refugees (59.6%). However, nearly half (50.4%)
felt that this right should also be granted to undocumented migrants.
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Table 3.31: Attitudes Towards Government Refugee Policy (%)
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
support support nor oppose
oppose
Giving asylum to people escaping 24.0 52.2 8.2 9.8 5.8
war and persecution
Increasing the number of refugees 2.9 9.0 12.7 41.5 34.0
who enter Zimbabwe
Granting permanent residence to 4.0 11.4 12.0 37.9 34.7
refugees (5 years and above)
Sending refugees back to their own 49.7 40.3 3.6 3.7 2.7
countries
Requiring all refugees to live in 27.1 40.0 16.5 10.2 6.2
special camps
Using money from the Zimbabwean 9.9 21.3 13.3 22.3 33.2
budget to shelter the refugees
Finally, they felt that the right to social services, such as education,
health and water, should be granted to Zimbabwean citizens, as well as
temporary workers/visitors (70.2%) and refugees (67.2%). Interestingly,
nearly 40% felt that undocumented migrants should also enjoy full
access. 
ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE: PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN ZIMBABWE
66
Table 3.32: Attitudes Towards Rights of Citizens and Foreigners (%)
Should Depends on Never be 
always be circumstances granted
granted
The right to say what you want, for Citizens 80.9 14.2 4.9
instance, criticise the government and Temporary 15.8 33.9 50.3
society workers/visitors
Refugees 10.0 25.5 64.5
Illegal 5.8 11.3 82.9
immigrants
The right to vote in Zimbabwean Citizens 97.3 2.0 0.7
elections Temporary 7.1 20.8 72.1
workers/visitors
Refugees 4.8 14.9 80.4
Illegal 3.9 5.7 90.4
immigrants
The right to legal protection, such as not Citizens 93.4 5.7 0.9
being detained without a trial, or having Temporary 56.3 30.3 13.3
a lawyer if you go to court workers/visitors
Refugees 48.9 30.8 20.3
Illegal 31.5 18.1 50.4
immigrants
The right to be protected by the police, Citizens 95.5 4.1 0.4
to be free from illegal searches, and to Temporary 66.7 24.5 8.8
have your property protected workers/visitors
Refugees 59.6 26.9 13.5
Illegal 31.5 18.1 50.4
immigrants
The right to social services such as Citizens 98.6 1.1 0.3
education, housing, health care and water Temporary 70.2 20.7 9.1
workers/visitors
Refugees 67.2 20.4 12.4
Illegal 36.8 16.7 46.5
immigrants
3.9 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The report has attempted to document the attitudes of Zimbabweans
towards foreign migrants in the country. The survey findings show that
Zimbabweans believe that the central criterion for Zimbabwean identity
is not colour or language but being born in Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans are
generally accepting of people from other African countries and feel they
have benefited from their interactions with them. Yet they feel that
non-citizens should not vote in elections and criticising the government
should be the sole privilege of Zimbabweans. However, they do agree
that foreign migrants, including “illegal immigrants”, have the right to
police and legal protection.
Given this scenario, it is important to ask how xenophobic
Zimbabweans are. The situation in Zimbabwe is certainly not as serious
as that in other countries.52 Zimbabweans are not likely to engage in
violence even when they become aware of the presence of foreign
migrants who are illegal. Firstly, it has to be noted that Zimbabweans
are wary of unauthorized migrants and want them to be kept out of the
country. However, they are against the use of any measures which draw
resources from the government budget. Second, they are divided on the
permanent settlement of contract workers. The farmers in the northern
and eastern parts of the country are allowed to engage contract workers
especially from Mozambique. Many respondents would like to see the
contract workers going back to their home countries after the expiry of
their contracts. Third, they are in favour of immigrants who possess
scarce skills or have capital to start business ventures which will help
develop the country. Fourth, with regard to refugee policies, they sup-
port government granting protection to those fleeing political persecu-
tion in their home country. However, the respondents would like to see
them housed in special camps prior to repatriation to their home coun-
tries once the situation becomes tenable. Fifth, they are unlikely to
engage in violent confrontations with foreign migrants, as the majority
of them reported that they would do nothing or would simply report
unauthorized migrants to the police. However, there are various stereo-
types associated with foreigners including the widespread belief that
they use local welfare services and bring diseases to the country. 
An important theme that also emerges from the research is the
rights of foreign migrants. When migrants cross borders, they do so as
bearers of human rights. The portable nature of these rights implies that
all states are obliged by international law to protect them. A consider-
able number of respondents in the survey showed ignorance of the
rights of foreigners. 
The survey showed that Zimbabweans are not well informed about
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the numbers of foreign migrants currently working in the country. Such
ignorance forms the basis of fears that lower-income and uneducated
respondents expressed towards foreign nationals who they view as job
stealers or being responsible for committing crimes in the country. The
contribution of foreign migrants to economic development has also
been highlighted in the research. Whilst the fears that were expressed
by the respondents regarding “illegal immigrants” are well-founded,
there is need for a co-ordinated immigration policy which ensures that
certain sectors which rely on immigrant labour (such as the agricultural
sector) are not affected.
Finally, the Zimbabwean public needs to be educated about the con-
tribution of foreign migrants towards the economic development of the
country. The survey has documented the role they play in the economic
development of the country. It is also important to educate the public
in this increasingly globalising world that society is becoming more cos-
mopolitan and dynamic. It is hoped that this research will contribute to
that goal. 
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